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Statutory Interpretation in the Roberts Court’s 
First Era: An Empirical and Doctrinal Analysis 
Anita S. Krishnakumar* 
This Article examines the Roberts Court’s statutory cases from its 2005–2008 Terms, 
beginning with cases decided after January 31, 2006, when Justice Alito joined the Court, 
and concluding with cases decided on June 29, 2009, when Justice Souter retired. The 
Article’s approach is both empirical and doctrinal, in that it (1) presents descriptive 
statistics illustrating the Court’s and individual Justices’ rates of reliance on fourteen 
different tools of statutory construction, and (2) engages in doctrinal analysis of the 
Court’s statutory cases, highlighting discernable patterns in the individual Justices’ 
interpretive approaches. The Article makes two significant contributions to the field of 
statutory interpretation. First, it identifies an interpretive divide that seems to be doing 
significant work in the Roberts Court’s statutory cases—a divide that perhaps best can be 
described as one between “legal-landscape coherence” on the one hand, and “statute-
specific coherence” on the other. “Legal-landscape coherence” refers to an interpretive 
approach that focuses on the legal framework surrounding the statute at issue and seeks 
the statutory construction that fits most coherently into the existing legal structure; while 
“statute-specific coherence” refers to an interpretive approach that focuses on the 
individual statute at issue and preferences the statutory construction that creates an 
internally consistent and coherent policy across like situations and across time. The 
Article maps out the Justices’ theoretical divide in detail and shows how the divide 
translates into stark empirical differences in the Justices’ individual rates of reliance on 
particular interpretive canons and tools. 
This Article breaks new ground by uncovering an important difference in the form of 
practical considerations that different Justices tend to reference. Specifically, the Article 
demonstrates that the landscape-coherence Justices tend to focus on the administrability 
of an interpretation—that is, its effect on judicial resources, the difficulty of implementing 
it, and the clarity and predictability of the rule created; while the statute-specific Justices 
tend to focus on the constancy of the policy effected by an interpretation—for instance, 
whether it fosters a consistent application of the statute over time, the arbitrariness of the 
policy created, and the justness of the interpretation. The Article concludes with two case 
studies illustrating how the Roberts Court’s interpretive divide operates in practice and 
with a discussion about the theoretical implications of the divide. 
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Scholarly literature in the field of statutory interpretation long has 
tended towards the theoretical. The academic annals are rife with 
forceful, often heated, debate about the most legitimate approach to 
interpreting statutes, as well as bald assertions about the value or 
indeterminacy of particular interpretive canons and methodologies.1 In 
 
 1. See, e.g., Antonin Scalia, Common-Law Courts in a Civil-Law System: The Role of United 
States Federal Courts in Interpreting the Constitution and Laws, in Antonin Scalia, A Matter of 
Interpretation: Federal Courts and the Law 16–37 (1997) (advocating a textualist approach and 
denouncing the resort to legislative history or substantive policy norms in interpreting statutes); see 
also J.M. Balkin, Deconstructive Practice and Legal Theory, 96 Yale L.J. 743, 772–73 (1987) 
(describing originalism as the preferred method of statutory interpretation for most judges and 
lawyers); Stephen Breyer, On The Uses of Legislative History in Interpreting Statutes, 65 S. Cal. L. 
Rev. 845, 847 (1992) (defending legislative history use as legitimate); Frank H. Easterbrook, The Role 
of Original Intent in Statutory Construction, 11 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 59, 62 (1988) (“[O]riginal intent 
Krishnakumar_62-HLJ-221.doc (Do Not Delete) 1/13/2011 10:43 AM 
December 2010]    ROBERTS COURT’S FIRST ERA 223 
the early years following Justice Scalia’s ascension to the Supreme Court, 
it was particularly in vogue to argue the merits of “textualism”2 versus 
“intentionalism”3 and to observe that the Court had become more text-
focused and correspondingly less inclined to rely on legislative history in 
interpreting statutes.4 Until recently, almost no empirical measurements 
had been conducted to test such assertions. 
In the last decade-and-a-half, a few empirical studies of the Supreme 
Court’s statutory interpretation cases have emerged. These studies have 
ranged in scope, measuring various aspects of the Court’s interpretive 
methodology—from the use of canons of construction in workplace law 
cases,5 to the rise and fall of the Court’s reliance on legislative history,6 to 
 
rather than an objective inquiry . . . increases the discretion, and therefore the power, of the court.”); 
William D. Popkin, An ‘Internal’ Critique of Justice Scalia’s Theory of Statutory Interpretation, 76 
Minn. L. Rev. 1133, 1138 (1992) (offering a critical look at “Justice Scalia’s text- and rule-based 
approach” to interpreting statutes); W. David Slawson, Legislative History and the Need to Bring 
Statutory Interpretation Under the Rule of Law, 44 Stan. L. Rev. 383, 383–84 (1992) (“I construct a 
second theory, ‘law as a statute.’ . . . [This will] provide a principled and effective constraint on the use 
of legislative history.”); Kenneth W. Starr, Observations About the Use of Legislative History, 1987 
Duke L.J. 371, 377 (criticizing legislative history use). 
 2. Textualism is an interpretive philosophy that prioritizes the statute’s text above all else. 
Proponents of this approach urge courts to resolve statutory cases solely with reference to the written 
text and discourage consultation of non-textual sources such as legislative history. See, e.g., Scalia, 
supra note 1, at 16–37; see also Frank H. Easterbrook, Legal Interpretation and the Power of the 
Judiciary, 7 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 87, 89–94 (1984); John F. Manning, Competing Presumption 
About Statutory Coherence, 74 Fordham L. Rev. 2009, 2027 (2006). 
 3. Intentionalism instructs courts to resolve interpretive questions in statutory cases by asking 
how the enacting Congress would have decided the question. Intentionalism invites substantial 
reliance on legislative history and other interpretive tools indicative of the enacting Congress’s desires. 
See, e.g., Richard A. Posner, The Federal Courts: Crisis and Reform 286–87 (1985) (“[T]he judge 
should try to put himself in the shoes of the enacting legislators and figure out how they would have 
wanted the statute applied to the case before him.”); Roscoe Pound, Spurious Interpretation, 7 Colum. 
L. Rev. 379, 381 (1907) (“The object of genuine interpretation is to discover the rule which the law-
maker intended to establish; to discover the intention with which the law-maker made the rule, or the 
sense which he attached to the words wherein the rule is expressed.”).  
 4. See, e.g., William N. Eskridge, Jr., The New Textualism, 37 UCLA L. Rev. 621, 623–25 (1990) 
(“[N]ew textualism posits that once the Court has ascertained a statute’s plain meaning, consideration 
of legislative history becomes irrelevant.”); Thomas W. Merrill, Textualism and the Future of the 
Chevron Doctrine, 72 Wash. U. L.Q. 351, 355–57 (1994) (finding an increase in “textualism” and a 
corresponding decline in the Court’s use of legislative history between 1981 and 1992); Richard J. 
Pierce, Jr., The Supreme Court’s New Hypertextualism: An Invitation to Cacophony and Incoherence in 
the Administrative State, 95 Colum. L. Rev. 749, 750–52 (1995) (criticizing the Court’s overuse of 
textualism); Frederick Schauer, Statutory Construction and the Coordinating Function of Plain 
Meaning, 1990 Sup. Ct. Rev. 231, 246 (“[P]lain language discourse dominates the Court’s statutory 
interpretation cases.”). 
 5. See James J. Brudney & Corey Ditslear, Canons of Construction and the Elusive Quest for 
Neutral Reasoning, 58 Vand. L. Rev. 1, 15 (2005). 
 6. See, e.g., James J. Brudney & Corey Ditslear, The Decline and Fall of Legislative History? 
Patterns of Supreme Court Reliance in the Burger and Rehnquist Eras, 89 Judicature 220, 222 (2006) 
(finding a higher rate of legislative history use, between 40% and 50%, in the period from 1969 to 
1986, with a drop off to 25% from 1986 to 2002); Merrill, supra note 4, at 355 (finding that use of 
legislative history had fallen to 18% by the 1992 Term); Patricia M. Wald, The Sizzling Sleeper: The 
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the Court’s patterns of deference to administrative agencies,7 to the 
frequency of the Court’s references to all interpretive tools in all 
statutory cases decided in one Term,8 to the alignment between the 
Court’s use of interpretive tools and the most prominent theoretical 
approaches—textualism, intentionalism, dynamic updating, or pragmatism.9 
This Article takes a slightly different approach, examining the 
Roberts Court’s reliance on the canons and other interpretive tools in all 
of its statutory cases from January 31, 2006, when Justice Alito joined the 
Court, to June 29, 2009, Justice Souter’s last day on the bench. My study 
differs from earlier empirical studies in a few significant respects. First, 
its data is culled from all of the cases decided by one particular Court—
the Roberts Court—rather than from a sampling of cases from various 
Terms and Courts. Second, it focuses not on measuring changes in the 
Court’s use of particular canons or interpretive tools over time, but on 
patterns and groupings of different Justices’ preferences for particular 
interpretive tools, and what these patterns reveal about the Justices’ 
goals in interpreting statutes. The Article, therefore, takes a combined 
empirical and doctrinal approach, relying on both descriptive statistics 
and doctrinal analysis of the Court’s opinions to paint a nuanced portrait 
of the Justices’ methodological points of departure in statutory cases. 
In the end, this Article reaches three conclusions. First, the data 
from the Roberts Court’s first era of statutory interpretation cases is 
consistent with Jane Schacter’s theory that the Supreme Court interprets 
statutes in a manner she dubbed “common law originalism.”10 Based on 
empirical observations of forty-eight statutory cases decided during the 
Court’s 1996 Term, Schacter has argued that the Court’s interpretive 
methodology is part “originalist,” in that it involves significant reliance 
on statutory language as an “interpretive anchor,” and part “common 
law,” in that the Court draws from a number of judicially created 
 
Use of Legislative History in Construing Statutes in the 1988–89 Term of the United States Supreme 
Court, 39 Am. U. L. Rev. 277, 280, 287–88 (1990) (finding that the Court used legislative history in 
almost every statutory interpretation case in the 1981 Term, with the rate declining to 75% for the 
1988–1989 Term); see also David S. Law & David Zaring, Law Versus Ideology: The Supreme Court 
and the Use of Legislative History, 51 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 1653, 1683–84 (2010) (tracking, inter alia, 
the Court’s rate of legislative history use from 1953 to 2006). 
 7. See William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Lauren E. Baer, The Continuum of Deference: Supreme Court 
Treatment of Agency Statutory Interpretations from Chevron to Hamdan, 96 Geo. L.J. 1083, 1098 
(2008). 
 8. See Jane S. Schacter, The Confounding Common Law Originalism in Recent Supreme Court 
Statutory Interpretation: Implications for the Legislative History Debate and Beyond, 51 Stan. L. Rev. 
1, 4 (1998). 
 9. See Frank B. Cross, The Theory and Practice of Statutory Interpretation 136–37, 143–48 
(2009); Nicholas S. Zeppos, The Use of Authority in Statutory Interpretation: An Empirical Analysis, 
70 Tex. L. Rev. 1073, 1074–76 (1992). 
 10. See Schacter, supra note 8, at 5. 
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resources to choose between plausible statutory constructions.11 Data 
from the Roberts Court’s first three-and-a-half Terms12 supports this 
characterization, demonstrating substantial judicial reliance on originalist 
sources, such as statutory language and structure, as well as on common 
law sources, such as prior judicial interpretations and judicial 
observations about the practical consequences13 likely to result from 
certain interpretations. 
Second, the data also suggest that Schacter’s common law 
originalism theory paints an incomplete picture of the Supreme Court’s 
interpretive methodology in statutory cases. Something more nuanced 
than simple, across-the-board common law judging, tempered by 
attention to the text appears to be taking place beneath the surface in 
several of the cases. My analysis of canon and interpretive tool reliance 
in majority versus dissenting opinions and of the individual Justices’ rates 
of reliance on particular canons and interpretive tools suggests that, 
while all of the Justices seek to make sense of statutes they interpret, the 
individual members of the Court possess different points of departure for 
what the relevant “sense” is. 
In my observation, there are two principle camps, or schools of 
thought, reflected in the Roberts Court’s opinions with respect to what 
kind of “sense” a judicial interpreter should strive to make of the statute 
before her. The first camp seems to regard the relevant “sense” with 
reference to the larger legal landscape. Doctrinally, members of this 
camp tend to justify their interpretations as necessary to make a statutory 
provision fit coherently into the existing legal framework, like a piece in 
a puzzle. These Justices focus not only on the statute at issue, but also, 
and sometimes more so, on the puzzle pieces (related legal rules) already 
in place, such as the entire United States Code (all federal statutes), prior 
judicial interpretations of similar statutes, the Constitution and 
background norms derived from it, and the common law rule in the 
relevant field. Empirically and methodologically, the Justices in this 
camp exhibit a measurable preference for interpretive tools that foster 
consistency with the overarching legal landscape, including other statutes 
with similar language, Supreme Court precedents interpreting similar 
statutory provisions, substantive canons of construction14 reflecting 
 
 11. Id. 
 12. The study includes cases from the second half of the Court’s 2005 Term (following Justice 
Alito’s ascension to the bench at the end of January, 2006) and from the full 2006, 2007, and 2008 
Terms. 
 13. Schacter calls this latter interpretive resource “judicially-selected policy norms.” Schacter, 
supra note 8, at 5, 12. 
 14. Substantive canons reflect a judicially preferred policy position. They are not predicated on 
presumptions about what the words of a statute should mean, but instead reflect judicial rules of 
thumb about how to treat statutory text in light of constitutional priorities, pre-enactment common 
law practices, or specific statutorily-based policies. See infra pages 243–44 for a detailed explanation 
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background constitutional or policy norms, generally applicable 
dictionary definitions and meanings of words, and common law 
precedents in the relevant field.15 The Justices in this camp also pay 
significant attention to the practical consequences likely to result from a 
particular interpretation, to ensure that the rule announced in the instant 
case does not create an unworkable rupture in the overarching legal 
landscape. 
The second camp, which finds itself in dissent more often than the 
first, is less focused on the legal landscape and more focused on the 
policy embodied in the particular statute before the Court. Its members 
seem to consider it their primary interpretive goal to “make sense” of 
Congress’s handiwork in the individual statute at issue. This camp, while 
not inattentive to legal landscape concerns, places greater interpretive 
weight on canons and interpretive tools that focus on the statute at hand 
and that foster consistent and coherent fulfillment of the individual 
statute’s provisions. Empirically, Justices in this camp exhibit a higher 
degree of reliance on statutory purpose, inferences regarding 
congressional intent, and legislative history16 than do the Justices who fall 
into Camp One. Like the Camp One Justices, they also pay attention to 
the practical consequences likely to result from a particular 
interpretation, but with an eye towards ensuring an internally consistent 
and coherent statutory policy. This is not to say that Camp Two Justices 
do not rely on Supreme Court precedent, other statutes, or the other 
preferred tools of Camp One Justices—but merely that they rely less 
frequently on such landscape-oriented tools than they do on the statute-
specific coherence-promoting tools described above. Doctrinally, Camp 
Two Justices tend to lead with the statute-specific oriented canons and 
interpretive tools and to emphasize the importance of maintaining a 
consistent statutory policy over time. 
Third, while it is no longer novel to observe that Supreme Court 
Justices frequently reference the practical consequences of particular 
statutory constructions,17 this Article’s empirically-informed doctrinal 
analysis suggests that the two camps vary markedly in the form of 
practical consequences to which they tend to give weight when 
construing statutes. That is, the Camp One Justices tend to focus on 
administrability concerns, such as the effect on judicial resources, clarity, 
and predictability created by an interpretation; whereas, the Camp Two 
Justices tend to focus on concerns about policy constancy, including 
whether the interpretation maintains a consistent statutory policy over 
 
and examples of different kinds of substantive canons. 
 15. Each of these interpretive tools is explained in detail infra page 241–45. 
 16. Each of these interpretive resources is examined in detail infra pages 245–46. 
 17. See discussion infra Part I and accompanying notes (discussing Zeppos’s and Schacter’s 
findings in previous studies). 
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time, the arbitrariness or incoherence of the policy created by the 
interpretation, and the fairness of the interpretation. 
Part I of this Article briefly reviews four of the most recent 
empirical studies of the Supreme Court’s statutory interpretation cases. 
Part II presents data about the individual Justices’ relative rates of 
reliance on different interpretive tools in the opinions they authored, 
mapping out in detail the Justices’ interpretive and methodological 
divide over legal-landscape versus statute-specific coherence. Part III 
examines case studies from the Roberts Court’s last three-and-a-half 
Terms that doctrinally illustrate how the coherence divide operates in 
practice. Part IV concludes with a discussion of the differences between 
statute-specific coherence, purposivism, and intentionalism and with 
observations about the ideological implications of the coherence divide. 
I. What We Know So Far: Previous Empirical Studies of 
Statutory Interpretation  
A handful of empirical studies of Supreme Court statutory 
interpretation cases have been conducted to date. These studies variously 
have concluded that the Court’s rate of reliance on canons of 
construction has increased over time, while its use of legislative history 
has declined;18 the Court’s use of legislative history is experiencing a 
“resurgence”19; the Court has become more textualist and less willing to 
rely on legislative history;20 the Court rarely references the Chevron test 
and uses ad hoc judicial reasoning when deciding whether to defer to 
agency interpretations;21 and the Court’s approach to statutory 
interpretation does not match up neatly with any of the prevailing 
theories of statutory interpretation.22 Some of the studies have noted the 
Court’s open reliance on pragmatic considerations in construing 
statutes.23 A few have characterized the Court’s approach to statutory 
interpretation as “eclectic” or “pluralis[t],”24 concluding that the Justices 
seem willing to use whatever interpretive tool they deem best suited to 
the case at hand—relying on legislative history in one case, statutory text 
and the dictionary in the next, and pragmatic policy concerns in a third. 
This Part briefly reviews the major findings of four recent empirical 
studies of relatively broad scope, that is, studies that measured the 
Court’s reliance on a variety of interpretive tools, rather than focusing on 
 
 18. See Brudney & Ditslear, supra note 5, at 35. 
 19. See Schacter, supra note 8, at 5. 
 20. See Merrill, supra note 4, at 355. 
 21. See Eskridge & Baer, supra note 7, at 1090. 
 22. See Cross, supra note 9, at 144–46; Zeppos, supra note 9, at 1106. 
 23. See, e.g., Cross, supra note 9, at 147–48; Schacter, supra note 8, at 21; Zeppos, supra note 9, at 
1107–08. 
 24. See, e.g., Cross, supra note 9, at 157; Zeppos, supra note 9, at 1119 (“eclectic”). 
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just one tool, such as legislative history or deference to agency 
interpretations. 
In one of the first empirical studies of the Supreme Court’s statutory 
interpretation cases, Nicholas Zeppos sought to measure the Court’s 
existing practice against several prevailing theories about how statutes 
should be construed.25 After measuring the Court’s citations to a wide 
range of authorities in a random sample of 413 cases decided between 
1890 and 1990, Zeppos concluded that although the Court made frequent 
references to legislative sources,26 including text27 and legislative history,28 
the Court’s methodology could not be described as either predominantly 
“originalist”29 or “textualist,” because it relied on neither textual nor 
originalist sources in a significant percentage of cases and, conversely, 
often relied on both textual and nontextual sources in the same case.30 
Zeppos further observed that the Court referenced “consequentialist or 
practical considerations” in 28% of the cases studied31 and argued that 
this suggested the Court was far more “dynamic” in its interpretive 
approach than scholars had realized.32 
Schacter’s empirical study of the Court’s 1996 Term has been 
discussed in some detail above. Like Zeppos, Schacter found striking the 
Court’s reliance on what she termed “judicially-selected policy norms,” 
reflecting pragmatic and consequentialist concerns about the likely 
results of a particular interpretation.33 Schacter’s “judicially-selected 
policy norms” seem to measure the same types of references as Zeppos’s 
“consequentialist or practical considerations”—that is, references to 
desirable or adverse policy consequences likely to flow from a particular 
interpretation, or arguments that a particular interpretation will produce 
results that undermine important public values. But Schacter found a 
remarkably high rate of reference to such policy norms—73%—in her 
 
 25. Zeppos, supra note 9, at 1076–88 . 
 26. Zeppos grouped all of the sources of authority cited by the Court into six larger categories: 
(1) legislative, (2) executive, (3) judicial, (4) constitutional, (5) canons of interpretation, and (6) other. 
Id. at 1089. 
 27. Id. at 1093 (reporting that 84% of cases studied referenced the statute’s text). 
 28. Id. (reporting that congressional reports are cited in 32% of the cases studied, debates in 
16.9% of cases studied, and hearing material in 12.6% of the cases studied). 
 29. Zeppos used the term “originalism” rather than “intentionalism” to describe the interpretive 
philosophy that focuses on fulfilling the enacting of Congress’s intent. See id. at 1078. 
 30. See id. at 1118–20. 
 31. Id. at 1097. 
 32. See id. at 1107–08. Dynamic theories of statutory interpretation focus on the public values or 
practical consequences of an interpretation, urging courts to construe statutes in a manner that is 
responsive to current, real-world societal needs. See, e.g., William N. Eskridge, Jr., Dynamic Statutory 
Interpretation, 135 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1479, 1479 (1987) (“Statutes . . . should . . . be interpreted ‘dynamically,’ 
that is, in light of their present societal, political, and legal context.”). 
 33. See Schacter, supra note 8, at 5, 12, 18, 21. 
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dataset.34 It is difficult to determine whether the difference between the 
studies results from different coding criteria, from the larger sample size 
of Zeppos’s study, or from differences in Court composition during the 
time frame of the two studies. All three factors are likely at play, but the 
important point is that both studies found a significant rate of reliance on 
consequentialist35 considerations in the Court’s interpretive methodology. 
As discussed in greater detail in Part II.B, my study of the Roberts 
Court’s statutory cases similarly found references to practical 
consequences in a significant percentage of the cases.36 Schacter also 
found significant judicial reliance on legislative history37 and 
congressional intent, and comparatively little reliance on dictionaries.38 
More recently, Frank Cross examined a sample of 120 cases from 
the Court’s 1994 through 2002 Terms.39 Cross’s aim was to measure the 
Court’s and individual Justices’ patterns of canon usage for consistency 
with the different theoretical approaches, as well as to test the various 
interpretive methodologies’ ability to constrain ideological 
decisionmaking.40 He coded for judicial reliance on several specific 
canons and interpretive tools and then grouped these canons and tools 
into four categories corresponding to the predominant interpretive 
theories: Intentionalism, Textualism, Canons, and Pragmatism.41 Cross’s 
study, like Zeppos’s, found significant reliance on both textual and 
intent-focused sources, reporting that a majority of cases made some 
positive use of at least one tool of legislative intent, as well as some 
reference to statutory text.42 His study found “much less” reliance on 
pragmatic or practical considerations,43 and still less reliance on the 
canons of construction (10% of cases studied).44 Finally, with respect to 
ideology, Cross’s study found that the use of textualist tools showed no 
constraining effect on the liberal or conservative outcome of a ruling, but 
 
 34. See id. at 18 tbl.I. 
 35. See, e.g., Richard A. Posner, The Problems of Jurisprudence 465 (1990) (“Law as currently 
conceived . . . [places] too much emphasis on authority, certitude, rhetoric, and tradition, [and] too 
little on consequences and on social-scientific techniques for measuring consequences.”). 
 36. See infra Table 1 (in half of the cases studied, the majority, concurring, and/or dissenting 
opinions referenced the practical consequences of an interpretation). 
 37. Schacter, supra note 8, at 16, 18 tbl.1 (showing legislative history referenced in 49% of cases 
studied). 
 38. Id. at 14 (showing congressional intent referenced in 53% of cases studied, and dictionaries 
referenced in only 18% of cases studied). 
 39. See Cross, supra note 9, at 142–43; Frank B. Cross, The Significance of Statutory Interpretive 
Methodologies, 82 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1971, 1981 (2007). 
 40. Cross, supra note 9, at 143, 164. 
 41. Id. at 143–44. 
 42. Id. at 144, 146. 
 43. Id. at 147. 
 44. Id. at 146. 
Krishnakumar_62-HLJ-221.doc (Do Not Delete) 1/13/2011 10:43 AM 
230 HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 62:221 
that reliance on legislative intent and pragmatism pushed outcomes in a 
liberal direction.45 
In a slightly different vein, James Brudney and Corey Ditslear 
studied the Supreme Court’s use of the canons of construction in every 
workplace law case decided from 1969 to 2003.46 Brudney and Ditslear’s 
focus was on measuring the extent to which the canons operate as neutral 
rules constraining the Justices’ ability to interpret statutes based on 
ideological preferences.47 Brudney and Ditslear coded for judicial 
reliance on a number of interpretive sources, including language canons, 
which they defined to include grammar and linguistic canons, as well as 
the whole act rule,48 and substantive canons, defined as presumptions 
based on constitutional and common law norms about how statutes 
should be interpreted,49 and found, inter alia, that the Justices tend to use 
the canons to reinforce their ideological predispositions, with liberal 
Justices referencing the canons to reach liberal outcomes and 
conservative Justices referencing the canons to reach conservative 
outcomes.50 Brudney and Ditslear also found that the Court’s use of 
legislative history as an interpretive tool declined significantly from the 
Burger Court to the Rehnquist Court, falling from an average rate of 
reference of 42.1% between 1984 and 1988, to somewhere between 22 
and 25% from 1989 to 2003.51 
In sum, previous empirical studies have taught that the Court relies 
significantly on statutory text, as well as legislative intent and legislative 
history in interpreting statutes, although its rate of reliance on legislative 
history seems to have fluctuated over time. The studies also indicate that 
the Court references practical considerations, focusing on the 
consequences that an interpretation will produce, in a substantial 
percentage of statutory cases. 
II. The Roberts Court, 2005–2008 Terms: Empirical Findings 
This Part presents the data found in my examination of the Roberts 
Court’s first era statutory interpretation cases. Part II.A explains the 
methodology used to gather and evaluate the Court’s statutory cases. 
Part II.B provides an overview of the data on the Justices’ interpretive 
 
 45. Id. at 176. 
 46. See Brudney & Ditslear, Canons, supra note 5, at 5. 
 47. Id. at 4. 
 48. See E-mail from James J. Brudney, Newton D. Baker-Baker & Hostetler Professor of Law, 
Ohio State Univ. Moritz Coll. of Law (Feb. 27, 2008, 10:46 EST) (on file with author). Language 
canons are based on grammar rules and the arrangement of words or phrases within a statute, while 
the whole act rule is based on how the different sections of a statute fit together. Eskridge et al., infra 
note 102, at 862; Brudney & Ditslear, supra note 5, at 12. 
 49. See Brudney & Ditslear, supra note 5, at 5 & n.16. 
 50. See id. at 6. 
 51. See id. at 35. 
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practices. And Part II.C presents both detailed data and doctrinal 
analysis demonstrating the Court’s coherence divide. 
A. Methodology 
The findings and conclusions presented below are based on 
empirical and doctrinal analysis of all decisions in the Roberts Court’s 
2005 (post-January 31, 2006) through 2008 Terms that confronted a 
question of statutory interpretation. Every case decided during that time 
frame was examined through the Supreme Court’s online database to 
determine whether it dealt with a statutory issue. Any case in which the 
Court’s opinion contained a substantial discussion about statutory 
meaning was included in the study. Cases interpreting the Federal Rules 
of Civil Procedure (FRCP) were not included,52 but a handful of 
constitutional cases in which the Court was required to construe a federal 
statute before deciding the constitutional question were included. This 
selection methodology yielded 166 statutory cases over three and a half 
Terms, with 166 majority or plurality opinions, 65 concurring opinions, 
110 dissenting opinions, 9 part concurring/part dissenting opinions, and 2 
part majority/part concurring opinions, for a total of 352 opinions.53 
In analyzing these cases and opinions, my primary goal was to 
determine the frequency with which the Court referenced a range of 
interpretive sources when giving meaning to federal statutes. The cases 
in the study were examined for references to the following interpretive 
tools: (1) the statutory language of the provision at issue, including 
appeals to plain or ordinary meaning; (2) dictionary definitions; (3) a 
grammar-based canon or rule; (4) the whole act rule (inferences based on 
other sections of the same statute); (5) other statutes, including federal 
and sometimes state; (6) common law precedent; (7) substantive canons 
(for example, the rule of lenity and the canon of constitutional 
avoidance); (8) deference to agency interpretations; (9) Supreme Court 
precedent interpreting the same or related statutes; (10) statutory 
 
 52. I made this judgment call because the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure are created in a 
manner that differs significantly from federal statutes. Whereas federal statutes are enacted into law 
by both houses of Congress and the President pursuant to Article I, Section 7 of the Constitution; the 
FRCP are promulgated by the judicial branch, with minimal review by Congress, and do not require 
the President’s approval. Thus, several of the interpretive tools available when construing statutes 
either are not available with respect to the FRCP or provide a very different kind of context, from a 
very different perspective, when used to construe the FRCP—including legislative history, intent, 
other statutes, and text. See Paul D. Carrington & Roger C. Cramton, Judicial Independence in Excess: 
Reviving the Judicial Duty of the Supreme Court, 94 Cornell L. Rev. 587, 618 (2009); Natasha Dasani, 
Class Actions and the Interpretation of Monetary Damages Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 
23(B)(2), 75 Fordham L. Rev. 165, 194–95 (2006); Catherine T. Struve, The Paradox of Delegation: 
Interpreting the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 150 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1099, 1100–02 (2002). 
 53. For a list of the cases examined in the study—and the statutes they interpreted—see 
Appendix A, on file with the Hastings Law Journal. 
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purpose; (11) practical consequences; (12) legislative intent; (13) 
legislative history (including references to committee reports, floor 
debates, hearings, and a statute’s evolution); and (14) language canons 
such as noscitur a sociis and expressio unius.54 
These fourteen interpretive sources are consistent with those 
examined in previous empirical studies. A few differences in definitions 
used for the different sources were inevitable and will be pointed out 
where notable. First, unlike the Brudney and Ditslear study, which 
grouped together several interpretive tools under the heading “language 
canons,” I counted separately any references to grammar canons, 
linguistic canons, and the whole act rule. Second, I recorded as a 
reference to “practical consequences” any reliance on the absurdity of a 
result, the administrative or other burdens caused by an interpretation, 
the justness or fairness of an interpretation, the interpretation’s 
consistency with the policy of the statute, or other practical consequences 
expected to be produced by an interpretation. 
In recording the Court’s reliance on these interpretive tools, I 
counted only references that reflected substantive judicial reliance on the 
tool in reaching an interpretation. Instances in which the Court 
considered an interpretive tool but rejected it as unconvincing were not 
counted, nor were instances in which the Court merely acknowledged, 
but did not accept, a litigant’s argument that a particular canon or tool 
dictated a particular result. An example may help illustrate. In Watson v. 
United States, Justice Souter’s majority opinion relied on the plain 
meaning of the word “use” in the firearms enhancement statute, along 
with several corroborative dictionary definitions55 to hold that a person 
who trades his drugs in exchange for a gun does not “use” a firearm 
“during and in relation to . . . [a] drug trafficking crime.”56 Justice 
Souter’s opinion also rejected the government’s practical consequences 
argument that it would be asymmetrical for the criminal law to penalize a 
person who trades his gun for drugs, which was previously ruled to 
constitute “use” under the same statutory provision, but not to penalize 
the person on the other end of the exchange who receives the gun.57 The 
opinion was coded for reliance on text/plain meaning and the dictionary 
rule, but not for reliance on practical consequences. 
Secondary or corroborative references to an interpretive tool, on 
the other hand, were counted; thus, where the Court reached an 
 
 54. In order to reduce the risk of inconsistency, I, along with at least one research assistant, 
separately read and analyzed each opinion, and separately recorded the use of each interpretive 
resource. In the event of a disagreement, I reviewed and reconsidered the case and made the final 
determination as to how a particular interpretive resource should be coded. 
 55. 552 U.S. 74, 79–80 & n.7 (2007). 
 56. Id. at 76 (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 57. Id. at 81–82. 
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interpretation based primarily on one interpretive source but then went 
on to note that x, y, and z interpretive tools further supported that 
interpretation, the references to x, y, and z were coded along with the 
other sources. Again, an example may prove helpful. In Dean v. United 
States,58 Justice Stevens’ dissenting opinion argued that a sentencing 
enhancement triggered when a “firearm is discharged”59 should be read 
to apply only when the defendant intended to discharge the gun, and not 
in cases where the gun accidentally discharged during commission of the 
crime.60 In reaching this conclusion, Justice Stevens relied principally on 
whole-act-rule-based arguments about the structure of the sentencing 
enhancement provision,61 combined with legislative history and intent 
arguments62 which emphasized that Congress had amended the 
enhancement provision in response to the Court’s previous 
interpretation of the statute in Bailey v. United States.63 Justice Stevens 
went on to argue that even if the enhancement provision’s structure and 
history had not clearly pointed to the conclusion that it applies only to 
intentional discharges, common law presumptions about mens rea, 
Supreme Court precedent, presumptions of an intent requirement in 
other criminal statutes, the rule of lenity, and practical concerns about 
inequitable application of the enhancement provision64 all dictated the 
same interpretive outcome.65 The opinion was coded for references to the 
whole act rule, legislative history, legislative intent, common law 
precedent, Supreme Court precedent, other statutes, substantive canons 
such as the rule of lenity, and practical consequences. 
In addition, the vote margin in each case was recorded, and each 
case and opinion was recorded as unanimous, close margin (5–4, 5–3, 4–
1–4, or 5–2 where two Justices were non-participating), or wide margin 
(cases with six or more Justices in the majority). Each Justice’s vote in 
each case also was recorded, as were the authors of each opinion. 
 
 58. 129 S. Ct. 1849 (2009). 
 59. 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A)(iii) (2006). 
 60. Dean, 129 S. Ct. at 1856 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 61. Id. at 1857. 
 62. Id. 
 63. 516 U. S. 137, 148 (1995). 
 64. Specifically, Justice Stevens’s dissent argued that the majority’s interpretation of the 
enhancement provision would impose a harsher penalty for an act caused not by an “evil-meaning 
mind,” but by a clumsy hand (that is, accidental discharge of a gun) than it would for an act caused by 
both an “evil-meaning mind” and an “evil-doing hand” (that is, brandishing a gun with an intent to 
intimidate). 129 S. Ct. at 1859 (quoting Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 251–52 (1952)). 
 65. Id. at 1857–59 (citing Staples v. United States, 511 U. S. 600, 605–06 (1994); United States v. 
U.S. Gypsum Co., 438 U. S. 422 (1978); Morissette, 342 U.S. at 251–52). 
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B. Overview 
Before presenting the data, a few caveats are in order. First, my 
study covers only three and a half Supreme Court Terms and only 166 
statutory interpretation cases, decided by one set of the same nine 
Justices. Given the size of the dataset, great significance should not be 
placed on the precise percentages reported for the frequency with which 
the members of the Court relied on particular interpretive tools during 
this era. The number of cases reviewed in this study is large enough to 
provide some valuable broad-brushstroke insights, but the focus should 
be on the patterns that emerge, rather than on minute differences in the 
percentages reported. Second, although I suggest that the Justices fall 
into two basic interpretive camps, with some overlap, I make no claims to 
have discovered the Justices’ underlying, or “true,” motivations for 
deciding statutory cases; my empirical and doctrinal claims are confined 
to describing how the Justices publicly justify their statutory 
interpretations and to theorizing about discernable patterns in the kinds 
of public justifications they regularly provide. Third, I have not 
attempted to prioritize or empirically account for the weight that the 
Court gives to different interpretive tools in each case. Although the 
Court sometimes places great weight on certain interpretive tools and 
references others only for corroboration, ranking its relative reliance on 
such tools requires subjective judgments and is likely to produce 
unreliable empirical results, so I avoided it.66 
Fourth, while most of the coding performed in this study involved 
simple binary observations of whether a particular interpretive source 
was referenced or not, some of the coding required nuanced 
classifications of legal arguments—most notably, the coding identifying 
which form of practical consequences the Court was referencing. The use 
of such nuanced classifications may pose replicability issues, but it added 
a valuable dimension that was largely lacking in previous studies of the 
Supreme Court’s statutory interpretation methodology.67 In any event, 
 
 66. The exception is for legislative history. In addition to a variable that coded “yes” or “no” for 
legislative history usage, I also created a separate variable that coded for use of legislative history to 
“corroborate” an interpretation arrived at through other tools versus substantial “reliance” on 
legislative history to construe a statute. See infra Codebook. 
 67. See, e.g., Barry Friedman, Taking Law Seriously, 4 Perspectives on Pol. 261, 266–67 (2006) 
(criticizing much of the political science literature for, inter alia, focusing on the analysis of bare 
outcomes in lieu of the content of opinions); Kirk A. Randazzo et al., Checking the Federal Courts: 
The Impact of Congressional Statutes on Judicial Behavior, 68 J. Pol. 1006, 1008 (2006) (noting the 
lack of empirical studies that attempt to examine the impact of “traditional legal concepts” on judicial 
behavior); Gregory C. Sisk, The Quantitative Moment and the Qualitative Opportunity: Legal Studies 
of Judicial Decision Making, 93 Cornell L. Rev. 873, 884–86 (2008) (reviewing Frank B. Cross, 
Decision Making in the U.S. Courts of Appeals (2007)) (“[T]he law necessitates [empirical 
studies] . . . examining and classifying the content of judicial opinions rather than merely counting 
outcomes in cases.”). 
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the practical-consequences data and classifications are available for 
others to review and to agree or disagree with. 
Table 1 lists the frequency with which the Roberts Court relied on 
various interpretive tools in its majority, dissenting, and concurring 
opinions, as well as the Court’s overall rates of reliance on these sources 
in the 166 cases decided and the 352 opinions issued between the date 
Justice Alito joined the Court and the date Justice Souter retired. For 
each interpretive resource, Table 1 reports reliance as a percentage of 
the total number of cases, majority opinions, dissenting opinions, 
concurring opinions, and total opinions. The data demonstrate some 
unsurprising results, as well as some less expected ones. Unsurprisingly, 
the text/plain meaning of the statute and Supreme Court precedent were 
the most frequently relied upon interpretive resources, irrespective of 
opinion type. The Court’s significant reliance on its own interpretive 
precedents hardly is unexpected, as it reflects the application of 
traditional decisionmaking tools to the statutory context and may be 
driven at least in part by a need to legitimate the Court’s interpretation.68 
Further, a high rate of reliance on the Court’s own precedents is entirely 
consistent with the empirical findings in the studies discussed in Part I.69 
The frequency of the Court’s references to statutory text, likewise, is 
consistent with findings in prior empirical studies and suggests judicial 
sensitivity to the legal legitimacy interests achieved by grounding its 
construction in the language of the statute at issue.70 
 
 68. See, e.g., Frank B. Cross et al., Citations in the U.S. Supreme Court: An Empirical Study of 
Their Use and Significance, 2010 U. Ill. L. Rev. 489, 509 (finding that the need to legitimate the 
Court’s rulings is a significant factor contributing to its citation of precedent); James H. Fowler & 
Sangick Jeon, The Authority of Supreme Court Precedent, 30 Soc. Networks 16, 16 (2008) (arguing 
that given the judiciary’s political weakness and inability to implement its rulings, judicial power is 
limited by its perceived authority in our governmental system—a fact which puts pressure on the 
Court to justify its decisions with reference to stable legal standards, such as stare decisis). 
 69. See, e.g., Brudney & Ditslear, supra note 5, at 30 (finding reliance on Supreme Court 
precedent in 82.8% of cases studied); Schacter, supra note 8, at 18 (finding reliance on Supreme Court 
or other precedent in 100% of majority opinions of cases studied). 
 70. See, e.g., Cross, supra note 9, at 146; Brudney & Ditslear, supra note 5, at 30; Schacter, supra 
note 8, at 18; Zeppos, supra note 9, at 1092–93. 
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Table 1: Overall Roberts Court Rates of Reliance on Interpretive 
Canons and Tools71 
 
 
 71.  * Indicates chi-squared test reveals a significant difference between rates of reliance in 
Majority and Dissenting Opinions at p < .05. (For Text/Plain Meaning p = .015; for Other Statutes 
p = .024; for Common Law Precedent p = .018; and for Whole Act Rule p = .016). 
  ** Indicates chi-squared test reveals a significant difference between rates of reliance in 
Majority and Dissenting Opinions at p < .01. (For Dictionary Rule p = .003 and for Intent p = .005). 
  † Percentages reported in this column for Practical Consequences, Legislative History, and 
Whole Act Rule include 2– 3 part concurring/dissenting or part majority/concurring opinions not listed 
separately in the Table. The effect of these additional opinions on the percentages reported is 
minimal, at 1%. 
  ‡ Percentages reported in this column for Text or Plain Meaning, Dictionary Rule, Agency 
Deference, Supreme Court Precedent, Practical Consequences, Legislative History, and Whole Act 
Rule include 2–3 part concurring/dissenting or part majority/concurring opinions not listed separately 







(n = 166) 
Majority 
Opinions 
(n = 166) 
Dissenting 
Opinions 
(n = 110) 
Concurring 
Opinions 
(n = 65) 
All 
Opinions‡ 
(n = 352) 
Text/Plain 
Meaning* 
(p = .015) 
67.5% 55.4% 40.9% 33.8% 46.3% 
Dictionary Rule** 
(p = .003) 
29.5% 27.1% 11.8% 7.7% 18.5% 
Grammar Canons 10.2% 7.8% 3.8% 1.6% 5.1% 
Linguistic Canons 11.4% 7.8% 4.5% 1.6% 5.4% 
Language Canons 
(Grammar + 
Linguistic)       
19.9% 15.1% 7.3% 3.1% 9.9% 
Other Statutes* 
(p = .024) 39.2% 33.7% 21.8% 7.7% 24.4% 
Common Law 
Precedent* 
(p = .018) 
17.3% 13.3% 4.8% 7.7% 9.4% 
Substantive 
Canons 28.9% 18.7% 18.2% 4.6% 15.3% 
Whole Act Rule* 
(p = .016) 45.2% 36.8% 22.7% 7.7% 26.7% 
Agency Deference 14.5% 9.0% 7.3% 3.1% 8.2% 
Supreme Court 
Precedent 
65.0% 57.2% 46.4% 29.2% 47.7% 
Practical 
Consequences 
51.8% 36.1% 38.2% 20.0% 33.2% 
Purpose 41.0% 29.5% 27.3% 10.8% 25.0% 
Intent** (p = .005) 33.1% 16.9% 30.9% 9.2% 19.3% 
Legislative History 37.9% 26.5% 28.2% 6.2% 23.0% 
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The next most-frequently referenced interpretive tools in cases in 
which at least one opinion references the interpretive resource are 
practical consequences and the whole act rule, followed by other statutes, 
purpose, and legislative history. Legislative intent also is referenced in a 
substantial percentage of the Court’s statutory cases, though at a 
somewhat lower rate than the other most-frequently referenced 
interpretive sources. Of the cases in which at least one opinion references 
legislative history, 60.9% of the references are to committee reports, 
31.3% are to the statute’s evolution over time, 15.6% are to floor 
statements or debates, 9.4% are to hearings, 7.8% are to the absence of 
legislative history and the “dog that did not bark canon,”72 and 9.4% are 
to other types of legislative history, such as rejected legislative proposals 
or the identity of the statute’s drafter or the drafter’s non-legislative 
statements.73 This hierarchy of legislative history sources, from most-
frequently to least-frequently referenced, is roughly consistent with prior 
empirical studies.74 
When references to different interpretive tools in majority versus 
dissenting opinions are compared, however, a striking pattern emerges. 
Some interpretive tools were referenced with significantly greater 
frequency in dissenting opinions, while others were referenced far more 
frequently in majority opinions. For example, legislative intent was 
referenced in only 16.9% of the majority opinions studied, but was 
referenced at almost twice that rate in dissenting opinions (31%). 
 
 72. The canon is named after a famous Sherlock Holmes story, Silver Blaze, in which the fact that 
the dog did not bark while a racehorse was being stolen led the detective to deduce that the thief was 
someone the dog knew. See Arthur Conan Doyle, Silver Blaze, in 1 Sherlock Holmes: The 
Complete Novels and Stories 455, 475 (Bantam Books 1986) (1892). The canon holds that where the 
legislative history is silent, courts should not presume that Congress intended to work drastic changes 
in a law—on the theory that if drastic changes were intended, some legislator would have “barked” 
and highlighted the change somewhere in the legislative history. See, e.g., Chisom v. Roemer, 501 U.S. 
380, 396 (1991) (“We reject that construction because we are convinced that if Congress had such an 
intent, Congress would have made it explicit in the statute, or at least some of the Members would 
have identified or mentioned it at some point in the unusually extensive legislative history of the 1982 
amendment.”); id. 396 n.23 (“Congress’ silence in this regard can be likened to the dog that did not 
bark.” (citing Doyle, supra)). 
 73. There were 64 cases and 81 opinions that referenced one or more kinds of legislative history. 
A number of these cases and opinions cited more than one kind of legislative history. The percentages 
provided above reflect the proportion of cases (out of 64) in which the different kinds of legislative 
history were cited. The percentage of opinions (out of 81) in which these legislative history types were 
cited is as follows: 48.1% (39 of 81) of the opinions in which legislative history is cited refer to 
committee reports, 24.7% (20 of 81) refer to the statute’s evolution over time, 12.3% (10 of 81) refer 
to floor statements or debates, 7.4% (6 of 81) refer to hearings, 6.2% (5 of 81) refer to the absence of 
legislative history and invoke the “dog that did not bark canon,” and 7.4% (6 of 81) reference other 
types. 
 74. See Zeppos, supra note 9, at 1093 (reporting that congressional committee reports are cited in 
32% of the cases studied, debates in 16.9% of cases studied, and hearing material in 12.6% of the cases 
studied). 
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Further, purpose, practical consequences, legislative history, and 
substantive canons were referenced at nearly equal rates in both majority 
and dissenting opinions, whereas dictionaries, other statutes, common 
law precedents, text/plain meaning, and Supreme Court precedent were 
referenced at statistically significantly higher rates in majority opinions.75 
This dichotomy suggests that the majority, or winning coalition, 
approach to interpreting statutes may not be the Court’s exclusive 
interpretive method or the approach of choice for all members of the 
Court. Moreover, it hints at a methodological divide in the Court’s 
jurisprudence—between landscape-coherence oriented interpretive tools 
(higher rates of reference in majority opinions) and statute-specific 
coherence-oriented interpretive tools (higher or equal rates of reference 
in dissenting opinions). 
C. The Coherence Divide 
Recent empirical work has shown that traditional distinctions pitting 
textualism against intentionalism are artificial, at least when it comes to 
describing actual Supreme Court practice.76 All of the studies discussed in 
Part I found significant Supreme Court reliance on both text and 
legislative history, and the two most comprehensive studies found that 
the Justices often rely on both textual and legislative history sources in 
the same case.77 Based on their observations, the authors of these prior 
studies labeled the Court’s interpretive approach “eclectic,”78 
“pluralis[t],”79 “common law originalist,”80 and “dynamic-pragmatic,”81 
concluding that the Justices mix and match interpretive rules 
indeterminately. As explained in the Introduction, my empirical and 
doctrinal analysis of the Roberts Court’s 2005–2008 Terms’ statutory 
opinions suggests that there is more coherence and method to the 
interpretive madness than these prior studies acknowledge. 
Doctrinally, I argue that there are two basic interpretative camps on 
the Roberts Court: those Justices whose goal in construing statutes is to 
harmonize the individual statute with the rest of the legal landscape, and 
those Justices whose goal is to ensure that the specific policy embodied in 
the individual statute is sensibly and consistently applied, both internally 
and over time. I noted in the Introduction that the two camps exhibit 
different rates of reliance on particular interpretive tools, based on which 
interpretive goal the tools promote. Before turning to the data in Table 
 
 75. See supra Table 1. 
 76. See, e.g., Schacter, supra note 8, at 5; Zeppos, supra note 9, at 1117–18. 
 77. See supra notes 26–30 and accompanying text (referencing the Cross and Zeppos studies). 
 78. Zeppos, supra note 9, at 1119. 
 79. Cross, supra note 9, at 158. 
 80. Schacter, supra note 8, at 54. 
 81. See Zeppos, supra note 9, at 1091, 1107–13. 
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2, a few further words are in order to explain why certain interpretive 
tools should be considered landscape-coherence fostering, and others 
statute-specific coherence fostering. I begin with the interpretive aids 
that foster landscape coherence. 
1. Camp One: Legal-Landscape Coherence Tools 
Other Statutes. References to other statutes reflect a sort of “whole 
code” approach to statutory interpretation, in which the statute at issue is 
viewed as one component of a larger whole—that is, the United States 
Code. When the Justices rely on the meaning given to similar words and 
phrases in the rest of the United States Code to interpret the individual 
statute before the Court, they are ensuring that the individual statute 
“fits” or coheres with the existing statutory backdrop. The Justices often 
explain their reliance on other statutes by noting that Congress is 
“presumed” to be aware of the existing statutory landscape when it 
drafts new statutes, and to incorporate interpretations given to relevant 
preexisting statutes into the new statutes it enacts;82 however, such 
“presumptions” are little more than a legal fiction83 devised to legitimate 
judicial common law-style synthesis and harmonizing of multiple federal 
statutes. 
The Dictionary Rule. When a Justice references the dictionary to 
give meaning to the words or phrases in a statute, he or she is promoting 
a coherent legal landscape in two ways. First, when the dictionary 
referenced is Black’s Law Dictionary, the Justice is giving the individual 
statute a meaning that is based upon longstanding legal customs or 
conventions. Nearly 60% of the Roberts Court cases that reference the 
dictionary use a definition from Black’s Law Dictionary;84 thus, this form 
of landscape harmonization is at work in the majority of dictionary rule 
cases. Second, even when the Justices reference a dictionary other than 
Black’s Law, they are interpreting the individual statute based on a 
conventional meaning contained in an external, convention-reflecting 
source. This convention-reflecting source, moreover, can be consulted in 
 
 82. See, e.g., Atl. Sounding Co., Inc. v. Townsend, 129 S. Ct. 2561, 2577 (2009) (Alito, J., dissenting) 
(“When Congress incorporated FELA unaltered into the Jones Act, Congress must have intended to 
incorporate FELA’s limitation on damages as well. We assume that Congress is aware of existing law 
when it passes legislation.”); Rowe v. N.H. Motor Transp. Ass’n, 552 U.S. 364, 370 (2008) (“[W]hen 
judicial interpretations have settled the meaning of an existing statutory provision, repetition of the 
same language in a new statute indicates, as a general matter, the intent to incorporate its judicial 
interpretations as well.” (quoting Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith Inc. v. Dabit, 547 U.S. 71, 85 
(2006))). 
 83. See, e.g., Scalia, supra note 1, at 16 (“[Courts] simply assume . . . that the enacting legislature 
was aware of all those other laws. Well of course that is a fiction . . . .”). 
 84. Nearly 58% (26 of 45) of the majority opinions that referenced the dictionary cited Black’s 
Law Dictionary; 57.1% (28 of 49) of the cases that referenced the dictionary in at least one opinion 
cited Black’s Law Dictionary; and 47.7% (31 of 65) of all opinions that referenced the dictionary cited 
Black’s Law Dictionary. See Appendix B on file with the Hastings Law Journal. 
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subsequent cases to give the same meaning to the same words in other 
statutes or to other legal materials, continuing the landscape cohesion 
down the line. Indeed, to the extent that reliance on dictionary 
definitions—particularly from the same one or two dictionaries85—
becomes a staple of statutory interpretation, the dictionary itself acts as a 
harmonizing device, rather like a “Federal Code of Definitions” 
applicable to all statutes. 
Common Law Precedent. As with references to other statutes, when 
a Justice uses common law precedent as an interpretive aid, he or she is 
harmonizing the individual statute at issue with the existing legal 
backdrop. Statutory construction in light of common law rules promotes 
continuity and consistency throughout the legal system by forging a 
connecting thread between old laws and new laws, judge-made law and 
legislatively enacted law.86 
Substantive Canons. Substantive canons are interpretive 
presumptions and rules based on background legal norms, policies, and 
conventions.87 They derive primarily from the common law, the 
Constitution, and legal tradition.88 Perhaps the most famous substantive 
canon is the rule of lenity, which is based on an accused’s due process 
right to fair notice of the conduct prohibited by a criminal statute.89 The 
canon dictates that when a criminal statute is ambiguous and allows for 
more than one interpretation, courts should choose the interpretation 
that favors the defendant.90 Other prominent substantive canons include 
 
 85. The Court relied on one of two dictionaries (or both) in the overwhelming majority of its 
cases. The first was Black’s Law Dictionary, which was referenced in 57.7% of the cases. The second 
was Webster’s, either in the Third New International or New International edition or, on occasion, one 
of the Collegiate editions. A full 49% (24 of 49) of the cases citing a dictionary referenced Webster’s; 
42.2% (19 of 45) of the majority opinions citing the dictionary referenced Webster’s; and 53.8% (35 of 
65) of the opinions that cited a dictionary referenced Webster’s. A few of the cases and opinions 
referenced both Black’s Law Dictionary and Webster’s New International Dictionary; only 4 of 49 cases 
and 6 of 65 opinions referencing the dictionary failed to cite either Black’s Law Dictionary or 
Webster’s. The American Heritage Dictionary was referenced in 7 cases and opinions; Random House 
was referenced in 8 cases and 9 opinions; and the Oxford English Dictionary was referenced in 8 cases 
and opinions. See Appendix B on file with the Hastings Law Journal. 
 86. See, e.g., William N. Eskridge, Jr., Dynamic Statutory Interpretation 275–76 (1994). 
 87. See, e.g., Brudney & Ditslear, supra note 5, at 13. 
 88. See, e.g., Eskridge, supra note 86, at 276; Brudney & Ditslear, Canons, supra note 5, at 13 
(“[S]ubstantive canons reflect judicially-based concerns, grounded in the courts’ understanding of how 
to treat statutory text with reference to judicially perceived constitutional priorities, pre-enactment 
common law practices, or specific statutorily based policies.”). 
 89. See, e.g., Clark v. Martinez, 543 U.S. 371, 397 (2005) (Thomas, J., dissenting); United States v. 
Lanier, 520 U.S. 259, 266 (1997). 
 90. See, e.g., Evans v. United States, 504 U.S. 255, 289 (1992) (Thomas, J., dissenting); McNally v. 
United States, 483 U.S. 350 (1987); Scarborough v. United States, 431 U.S. 563, 579–80 (1977) 
(Stewart, J., dissenting). The rule of lenity was relied upon in 12.5% (6 of 48) of the Roberts Court 
2005–2008 Term cases that referenced a substantive canon. See Dean v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 1849, 
1859 (2009); United States v. Hayes, 129 S. Ct. 1079, 1088–89 (2009); United States v. Santos, 128 S. Ct. 
2020, 2024–26 (2008); United States v. Rodriquez, 553 U.S. 377, 404–05 (2008) (Souter, J., dissenting); 
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the avoidance canon, which directs the courts to avoid interpreting a 
statute in a manner that would render it unconstitutional or would raise 
serious constitutional concerns,91 and federalism clear-statement rules, 
which impose a strong interpretive presumption that unless Congress 
clearly expresses its intent to infringe on state rights in the text of a 
statute, the statute must not be interpreted to interfere with state 
functions,92 laws,93 or processes.94 Subject-matter-specific substantive 
canons include rules calling for deference for the practice and precedent 
of the Patent Office,95 narrow construction of tax exemptions,96 and a 
strong presumption in favor of enforcing labor arbitration agreements.97 
The substantive canons are, by nature non-statute-specific external rules, 
designed to navigate the boundaries between individual statutes and the 
rest of the puzzle pieces in the legal landscape. The avoidance canon, for 
example, seeks to side-step potential friction between the statute and 
constitutional principles, while federalism clear-statement rules attempt 
to fit federal statutes in and around existing state laws. Thus, when a 
Justice relies on a substantive canon to interpret a statute, he or she 
ensures that the individual statute is given a meaning that coheres with 
the background legal landscape. 
 
James v. United States, 550 U.S. 192, 219 (2007); Scheidler v. Nat’l Org. for Women, Inc., 547 U.S. 9, 
17–18 (2006).  
 91. See, e.g., Cherokee Nation v. Leavitt, 543 U.S. 631, 646 (2005); Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 
678, 696–99 (2001); Pub. Citizen v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 491 U.S. 440, 465–66 (1989). The avoidance 
canon was relied on in 18.8% (9 of 48) of the Roberts Court cases that referenced a substantive canon. 
See Nw. Austin Mun. Util. Dist. No. One v. Holder, 129 S. Ct. 2504, 2513 (2009); FCC v. Fox 
Television Stations, Inc., 129 S. Ct. 1800, 1811 (2009); Hawaii v. Office of Hawaiian Affairs, 129 S. Ct. 
1436, 1445 (2009); Bartlett v. Strickland, 129 S. Ct. 1231, 1247 (2009); Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 
723, 787 (2008); Gonzalez v. United States, 553 U.S. 242, 251 (2008); Office of Senator Mark Dayton v. 
Hanson, 550 U.S. 511, 514 (2007); Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 153 (2007); Rapanos v. United 
States, 547 U.S. 715, 737–38 (2006). 
 92. See, e.g., Nixon v. Mo. Mun. League, 541 U.S. 125, 138 (2004); BFP v. Resolution Trust Corp., 
511 U.S. 531, 544 (1994). 
 93. Rush Prudential HMO, Inc. v. Moran, 536 U.S. 355, 365 (2002); Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 
U.S. 470, 485 (1996). 
 94. McCormick v. United States, 500 U.S. 257, 268 n.6 (1991); City of Columbia v. Omni Outdoor 
Adver., Inc., 499 U.S. 365, 388 (1991). Federalism clear-statement rules, including the presumption 
against preemption of state laws, were referenced in 16.7% (8 of 48) of the Roberts Court cases that 
employed a substantive canon. See Wyeth v. Levine, 129 S. Ct. 1187, 1194–95 (2009); Altria Group, 
Inc. v. Good, 129 S. Ct. 538, 543 (2008) (Stevens, J., dissenting); Fla. Dep’t of Revenue v. Piccadilly 
Cafeterias, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 2326, 2337 (2008); Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., 552 U.S. 312, 334 (2008) 
(Ginsburg, J., dissenting); Watters v. Wachovia Bank, N.A., 550 U.S. 1, 31 (2007); Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 
738; Arlington Cent. Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Murphy, 548 U.S. 291, 296 (2006); Empire Healthchoice 
Assurance, Inc. v. McVeigh, 547 U.S. 677, 698 (2006). 
 95. See, e.g., Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 535 U.S. 722, 738 (2002). 
 96. See, e.g., United States v. Burke, 504 U.S. 229, 248 (1992) (Souter, J., concurring in the 
judgment); United States v. Wells Fargo Bank, 485 U.S. 351, 357 (1988). 
 97. See, e.g., Howsam v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 537 U.S. 79, 83 (2002); Groves v. Ring Screw 
Works, Ferndale Fastener Div., 498 U.S. 168, 173 (1990). 
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2. Camp Two: Statute-Specific Coherence Tools 
Purpose. When the Court relies on a statute’s purpose, objective, or 
underlying goals to give meaning to the words in the statute, it promotes 
continuity and coherence within the individual statute. Statutory purpose 
is a statute-specific interpretive resource; it comes from the four corners 
of the statute itself—usually the preamble—or from external sources 
specific to the statute at issue, such as the legislative history created 
during the statute’s drafting process. In this sense, purpose is a markedly 
different interpretive resource from the legal-landscape coherence tools, 
which employ sources external to the statute at issue—such as the 
dictionary, common law, or other statutes—to harmonize the specific 
statute’s meaning with the broader legal framework. 
Legislative History. Legislative history, like statutory purpose, is a 
statute-specific interpretive device that has almost nothing to do with the 
external legal landscape. It is a source external to the statute’s four 
corners, but one that is deeply related to those four corners; indeed, it 
includes materials that are the precursor to the statutory text at issue. 
Thus, when the Justices reference a statute’s evolution from bill to law, 
or statements made by those who drafted the statute as interpretive aids, 
they are using the statute’s past to provide context for its application to 
the present situation. Whether they reference legislative history to 
corroborate an interpretation arrived at through other tools, to clarify 
the scope of a particular word, or to understand how different statutory 
sections fit together, their focus is on all of the background information 
available for the individual statute at issue and on connecting the dots to 
ensure a consistent and coherent statutory policy. In contrast to the 
landscape-coherence approach, which harmonizes the individual statute’s 
meaning with the external legal background, interpretive references to 
legislative history seek to discover the individual statute’s meaning from 
its own internal background. 
Intent. References to legislative intent as an interpretive aid or 
justification for a particular statutory construction also focus on the 
background of the individual statute at issue, rather than on the 
surrounding legal landscape. Indeed, many of the Roberts Court’s 
references to legislative intent take the form of inferences based on the 
statute’s design, structure, or previous versions.98 When the Justices 
 
 98. See, e.g., Abuelhawa v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 2102, 2107 (2009) (“[The] history [of the 
Controlled Substances Act] drives home what is already clear in the current statutory text: Congress 
meant to treat purchasing drugs for personal use more leniently than the felony of distributing drugs, 
and to narrow the scope of the communications provision to cover only those who facilitate a drug 
felony. . . . [I]t is impossible to believe that Congress intended ‘facilitating’ to cause that twelve-fold 
quantum leap in punishment for simple drug possessors [who use a telephone to facilitate a drug 
purchase].”); Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 735–36 (2008) (holding that the Detainee Treatment 
Act’s grant of “exclusive” jurisdiction to the courts of appeals shows Congress’s intent that the courts 
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emphasize the intent reflected in a statutory provision, they are focusing 
on the particular statute’s policy and on keeping that policy both 
internally coherent and consistent over time. 
3. Camp-Transcendent Interpretive Tools 
Supreme Court Precedent. Prior judicial interpretations, like 
practical consequences, can foster both legal-landscape coherence and 
statute-specific coherence. Precedents in the relevant area of law, 
particularly interpretations given by the Supreme Court to the same 
words or phrases in similar statutes, are part of the legal landscape 
against which the statute at issue is being construed. Thus, efforts to 
reconcile or give meaning to an individual statute in light of the Court’s 
prior interpretations promote consistency and continuity in the legal 
system writ large. But this is not the only kind of consistency that 
reliance on Supreme Court precedent can promote. References to prior 
interpretations of the statutory provision at issue, other sections of the 
statute at issue, or related statutes on which the statute at issue was 
modeled can also foster statute-specific coherence by ensuring that the 
meaning given to the individual statute remains consistent across time 
and across similar situations.99 
Whole Act Rule. The whole act rule has many subparts, all of which 
focus in some way on the structure of the statute at issue and how its 
different sections fit together. One frequently referenced subpart is the 
rule against superfluities, which instructs courts to interpret a statute in a 
manner that gives effect to all of its provisions, such that no one part is 
rendered superfluous by another.100 Another regularly referenced subpart 
of the whole act rule is the presumption of statutory consistency, which 
directs courts to interpret the same or similar terms in a statute the same 
way.101 The whole act rule is at once focused on both the individual 
 
of appeals have a more limited role in enemy combatant status determinations than a district court has 
in habeas corpus proceedings); Scheidler v. Nat’l Org. for Women, Inc., 547 U.S. 9, 17–20 (2006) 
(stating that Congress did not intend for the Hobbs Act to create a freestanding physical violence 
offense, as evidenced by the fact that the Hobbs Act’s predecessor statute explicitly linked the physical 
violence it prohibited to a plan or purpose to injure commerce through coercion or extortion). 
 99. See, e.g., Fitzgerald v. Barnstable Sch. Comm., 129 S. Ct. 788, 797 (2009) (holding that Title IX 
does not preclude § 1983 actions alleging unconstitutional gender discrimination in schools based, in 
part, on precedents interpreting Title VI and the fact that Title IX was modeled on Title VI); Flood v. 
Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258, 284 (1972) (holding that the Sherman Antitrust Act does not apply to baseball, 
because the Court had previously so held (citing Toolson v. N.Y. Yankees, Inc., 346 U.S. 356 (1953); 
Fed. Baseball Club v. Nat’l League, 259 U.S. 200 (1922))). 
 100. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Eisenstein v. City of New York, 129 S. Ct. 2230, 2234 (2009); 
Hibbs v. Winn, 542 U.S. 88, 101 (2004); Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 113 (2001); 
United States v. Alaska, 521 U.S. 1, 59 (1997); 2A Norman J. Singer, Statutes and Statutory 
Construction § 46.06, at 181–86 (rev. 6th ed. 2000) (“A statute should be construed so that effect is 
given to all its provisions, so that no part will be inoperative or superfluous, void or insignificant . . . .”). 
 101. See, e.g., Powerex Corp. v. Reliant Energy Servs., Inc., 551 U.S. 224, 232 (2007); IBP, Inc. v. 
Alvarez, 546 U.S. 21, 34 (2005); Comm’r of Internal Revenue v. Lundy, 516 U.S. 235, 249–50 (1996); 
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statute and the entire United States Code. It promotes policy coherence 
within the individual statute by ensuring that the statute’s various parts 
make sense when read together; but it also promotes consistency and 
coherence in the United States Code by ensuring that certain parts of the 
Code—of which individual statutes are of course included—are not 
rendered extraneous or meaningless, and by harmonizing the meaning 
given to the same or similar words throughout all sections and 
subsections of the Code.102 In other words, the whole act rule fosters 
landscape coherence between the statutory provision at issue and the 
immediately adjacent puzzle piece in the legal landscape—that is, other 
provisions of the same statute. 
4. The Practical Consequences Divide 
Perhaps the most intriguing aspect of the coherence divide 
identified in this study is the following doctrinal dichotomy. There 
appear to be two different categories of practical consequences—
tracking the two interpretive camps—that the Justices reference when 
construing statutes. The first category, which might aptly be labeled 
“administrability concerns,” encompasses discussions about the practical 
difficulty of administering a particular interpretation,103 the likely effect 
on judicial or other public resources of a particular interpretation,104 the 
 
Gustafson v. Alloyd Co., Inc., 513 U.S. 561, 570 (1995). 
 102. See, e.g., William N. Eskridge, Jr. et al., Cases and Materials on Legislation: Statutes 
and the Creation of Public Policy 1066 (4th ed. 2007) (likening the whole act rule’s presumption 
that a word used multiple times in a statute has the same meaning throughout the statute to whole 
code/other statutes rules dictating that the statute at issue should be construed in light of 
interpretations already given to other federal statutes using the same language or dealing with the 
same subject matter—more specifically known as the in pari materia—and modeled or borrowed 
statutes’ rules). 
 103. See, e.g., Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 129 S. Ct. 2343, 2352 (2009) (“Price Waterhouse[’s] 
burden-shifting framework is difficult to apply. . . . [so] even if Price Waterhouse was doctrinally sound, 
the problems associated with its application have eliminated any perceivable benefit to extending its 
framework to ADEA claims.”); Bartlett v. Strickland, 129 S. Ct. 1231, 1244–45 (2009) (“Determining 
whether a [VRA] § 2 claim would lie . . . would place courts in the untenable position of predicting 
many political variables . . . that even experienced polling analysts and political experts could not 
assess with certainty, particularly over the long term.”); Norfolk S. Ry. Co. v. Sorrell, 549 U.S. 158, 169 
(2007) (“Departing from the common-law practice of applying a single causation for negligence and 
contributory negligence would have been a peculiar approach for Congress to take . . . [because as] a 
practical matter, it is difficult to reduce damages ‘in proportion’ to the employee’s negligence if the 
relevance of each party’s negligence to the injury is measured by a different standard of 
causation. . . . [I]t is far simpler for a jury to conduct the apportionment FELA mandates if the jury 
compares like with like—apples to apples.”). 
 104. Gonzalez v. United States, 553 U.S. 242, 249–50 (2008) (“Giving the attorney control of trial 
management matters is a practical necessity. ‘The adversary process could not function effectively if 
every tactical decision required client approval.’ . . . For these reasons we conclude that [the statute 
must be read so] that express consent by counsel suffices to permit magistrate judge to preside over 
jury selection . . . .” (quoting Taylor v. Illinois, 484 U.S. 400 (1988))); Panetti v. Quarterman, 551 U.S. 
930, 943 (2007) (“As a result [of an alternative construction], conscientious defense attorneys would be 
obligated to file unripe (and, in many cases, meritless) . . . claims . . . . This counterintuitive approach 
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consistency or lack thereof between federal and state laws created by the 
interpretation,105 and the clarity or predictability of the legal rule or 
landscape going forward, in light of the interpretation.106 The second 
category, which I have dubbed “policy constancy concerns,” includes 
discussions about the inconsistencies in statutory policy likely to result 
from an interpretation,107 the fairness of an interpretation,108 the 
likelihood that the interpretation will render the statutory provision 
“meaningless” or ineffective,109 and the possibility that logical absurdities 
 
would add to the burden imposed on courts, applicants, and the States, with no clear advantage to 
any.”). 
 105. See, e.g., Cuomo v. Clearing House Ass’n, L.L.C., 129 S. Ct. 2710, 2717–18 (2009) (finding that 
everyone acknowledges that the National Bank Act leaves in place some state substantive laws 
affecting banks, but the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency’s regulation says that the State may 
not enforce its valid non-preempted laws against national banks, and that this is a “bizarre” result); 
Wyeth v. Levine, 129 S. Ct. 1187, 1230–31 (2009) (Alito, J., dissenting) (criticizing majority’s 
interpretation for creating an incoherent regulatory scheme by allowing state tort law claims based on 
a hospital’s use of a risky IV-injection practice approved by the FDA for drug A, when the FDA 
continues to allow the practice for more dangerous cancer medications with a greater risk of causing 
death—thus, rendering the federal regulations inconsistent with state tort law); United States v. 
Rodriquez, 553 U.S. 377, 383 (2008) (finding that an alternative interpretation would result in the 
possibility that defendants offending for a second, third, or more times could be sentenced in state 
court to more than five years for a crime that federal courts had deemed, for purposes of the Armed 
Career Criminal Act, to have a maximum term of five years). 
 106. Fed. Express Corp. v. Holowecki, 552 U.S. 389, 419–20 (2008) (Thomas, J., dissenting) 
(“Today’s decision does nothing—absolutely nothing—to solve the problem that under the EEOC’s 
current processes no one can tell, ex ante, whether a particular filing is or is not a charge.”); James v. 
United States, 550 U.S. 192, 215 (2007) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (criticizing the majority’s interpretation 
as “ad hoc” and for failing to provide concrete guidance to lower courts going forward). 
 107. Kimbrough v. United States, 552 U.S. 85, 94–95 (2007) (finding the disparity between 
recommended sentences for crack cocaine and powder cocaine means that a major supplier of powder 
cocaine could receive a shorter sentence than a low-level dealer who buys powder from the supplier 
and converts it to crack); Watson v. United States, 552 U.S. 74, 84 (2007) (Ginsburg, J., concurring) 
(finding it “makes scant sense” to distinguish between trading a gun for drugs, which counts as “use” 
of a firearm, and trading drugs for a gun, which doesn’t count as “use” according to majority’s 
opinion). 
 108. Gross, 129 S. Ct. at 2358–59 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (finding that plaintiffs cannot prove 
employer’s but-for reliance on age in age-discrimination cases, since the employer is in best position to 
know what he or she was thinking at the time, so the fair and appropriate test is whether plaintiff can 
show that the forbidden motive played some role in the employer’s decision); AT&T Corp. v. Hulteen, 
129 S. Ct. 1962, 1977–78 (2009) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (noting that the plaintiffs, comprised of 
female retirees seeking to have their pregnancy leave included in their pension calculations, made 
“modest claims,” which could be satisfied without interrupting the “settled expectations of other 
workers”). 
 109. United States v. Hayes, 129 S. Ct. 1079, 1087 (2009) (“[Alternative construction] would 
[render the statute] ‘a dead letter’ in some two-thirds of the States from the very moment of its 
enactment.”); Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 550 U.S. 618, 649–50 (2007) (Ginsburg, J., 
dissenting) (arguing that because salaries often are kept confidential, a victim of Title VII 
discrimination may not know immediately that she has been discriminated against, and that it is 
meaningless to give victims the right to sue but then bar recovery if they do not sue immediately, even 
if they are not initially aware of the discrimination), overruled by statute, Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act 
of 2009, Pub. L. 111–2, 123 Stat. 5 (2009). 
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or statutory incoherence are likely to result from the interpretation.110 
These two categories of practical consequences give precedence to 
different aspects of the interpretive task and seem to reflect the 
interpretive priorities at work in the landscape- versus statute-specific 
coherence divide. Like the landscape-coherence approach, administrability 
concerns focus on how a particular interpretation will affect the legal 
system—that is, whether it will waste judicial resources, whether it will 
prove impossible or burdensome to administer, whether it will result in 
unclear or unpredictable rules, and whether it will cause a conflict 
between rules set by different institutions, such as legislative versus 
executive, federal versus state, and administrative versus judicial entities. 
Conversely, policy constancy concerns track the statute-specific 
coherence approach in that they focus on ensuring that the statute at 
issue is applied consistently over time and across like situations, that it is 
applied in a just manner, and that it is not given an interpretation that 
renders it meaningless or nonsensical. A few examples should help 
illustrate these differences. 
In Arlington Central School District Board of Education v. Murphy, 
the statutory issue was whether the parents of a disabled student who 
had won an Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA)111 
lawsuit against their child’s school district could recover expert 
consultant’s fees from the district.112 The relevant statutory text enables 
parents who bring successful IDEA lawsuits to recover “reasonable 
attorneys’ fees,” but says nothing about expert’s fees.113 The Court ruled, 
6–3, that absent express statutory authority indicating that school 
districts would be liable for expert’s fees, successful IDEA litigants could 
not recover such fees.114 Justice Breyer, writing in dissent, made a typical 
“policy constancy” practical consequences argument. Experts, he noted, 
are necessary for most IDEA cases but are very expensive.115 Absent the 
possibility of ultimately recovering an expert’s fees from the school 
district, many disabled litigants and their parents might be unwilling to 
 
 110. Forest Grove Sch. Dist. v. T.A., 129 S. Ct. 2484, 2495 (2009) (finding the school district’s 
interpretation “would produce a rule bordering on the irrational” whereby IDEA would provide a 
remedy when the school district offers child an inadequate individualized education program, but not 
in the “more egregious situation” where the school district unreasonably denies a child access to such 
services altogether); Dean v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 1849, 1859 (2009) (Stevens, J., dissenting) 
(finding that the majority’s construction produces the “strange result” of imposing a substantially 
harsher penalty for an accidental act caused not by an “evil-meaning mind,” but by a clumsy hand, 
than would be imposed for the intentional act of brandishing a firearm). 
 111. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(3)(B) (2006). 
 112. 548 U.S. 291, 293–94 (2006). 
 113. Id.  
 114. Id. at 296–97.  
 115. Id. at 314 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
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hire experts in the first place.116 As a result, he worried that disabled 
litigants would have a harder time proving an IDEA violation, and that 
the majority’s interpretation would lead to underenforcement of the 
rights protected by the IDEA, as well as render the IDEA provision 
allowing lawsuits and attorney’s fees against non-complying school 
districts meaningless.117 In other words, Justice Breyer expressed concern 
that the statute’s individual policy (as opposed to the legal landscape) 
would be rendered incoherent by the majority’s interpretation. 
Justice Stevens’s dissenting opinion in FCC v. Fox Television 
Stations, Inc.118 similarly invoked policy constancy arguments about the 
practical consequences that would result from the majority’s 
interpretation of the Federal Communications Act.119 The statutory 
provision at issue prohibits the broadcasting of “any obscene, indecent, 
or profane language.”120 The FCC had, for years, interpreted this 
provision in a manner that counted as indecent only “deliberate and 
repetitive use [of expletives] in a patently offensive manner.”121 In 2006, 
however, the FCC changed its interpretation, deeming “actionably 
indecent” two live broadcasts in which celebrities fleetingly uttered two 
expletives, one as a slap-in-the-face to her critics, and another as a joke.122 
In upholding the FCC’s reversal, the majority construed the word 
“indecent” to include any expletive that has a “sexual or excretory 
origin” (and argued that its prior case law had endorsed this definition as 
well).123 Justice Stevens criticized the FCC’s interpretation on two policy 
constancy fronts. First, he argued that the majority’s interpretation 
 
 116. Id. 
 117. Id. at 315–16 (“In a word, the Act’s statutory right to a ‘free’ and ‘appropriate’ education may 
mean little to those who must pay hundreds of dollars to obtain it. . . . Today’s result will leave many 
parents and guardians ‘without an expert with the firepower to match the opposition,’ a far cry from 
the level playing field that Congress envisioned.” (citation omitted) (quoting Shaffer v. Weast, 546 
U.S. 46, 61 (2005))). 
 118. 129 S. Ct. 1800 (2009). 
 119. 47 U.S.C. §§ 151–614 (2000). 
 120. 18 U.S.C. § 1464 (2006); Public Telecommunications Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102–356, 16a, 
106 Stat. 949, 954 (codified at 47 U.S.C. § 303 note (2000)). 
 121.  Fox Television, 129 S. Ct. at 1806–07, 1827 (quoting Pacifica Found., 2 FCC Rcd. 2698, 2699, 
¶13 (1987)). 
 122. Id. at 1808.  
The first [incident] occurred during the 2002 Billboard Music Awards, when the singer Cher 
exclaimed, “I’ve also had critics for the last 40 years saying that I was on my way out every 
year. Right. So f*** ‘em.” The second involved a segment of the 2003 Billboard Music 
Awards, during the presentation of an award by Nicole Richie and Paris Hilton, principals 
in a Fox television series called “The Simple Life.” Ms. Hilton began their interchange by 
reminding Ms. Richie to “watch the bad language,” but Ms. Richie proceeded to ask the 
audience, “Why do they even call it ‘The Simple Life?’ Have you ever tried to get cow s*** 
out of a Prada purse? It’s not so f***ing simple.” 
Id.  
 123. Id. at 1805–06. 
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would lead to absurd results—for example, a golfer who shanks a shot 
and swears would now be considered to be describing sex or 
excrement.124 Second, he emphasized that the FCC was making a big 
policy shift without acknowledging it and without giving reasons for the 
shift, and he maintained that it was arbitrary and capricious—or, 
incoherent—for the agency to reverse its longstanding policy without 
providing some justification for the change.125 
In the opposite vein, Justice Alito’s opinion for the Court in Richlin 
Security Service Co. v. Chertoff 126 advanced classic administrability 
arguments in favor of its interpretation of the Equal Access to Justice 
Act (EAJA).127 After prevailing against the Government on a claim 
originating in the Department of Transportation’s Board of Contract 
Appeals, Richlin filed an application with the Board seeking 
reimbursement of its attorney’s fees, expenses, and costs, pursuant to the 
EAJA.128 The issue in the case was whether Richlin was entitled to 
recover its paralegal fees from the Government at prevailing market 
rates, or at the cost to the law firm of the paralegal’s time.129 The Court 
concluded that the EAJA authorized Richlin to recover the fees at 
prevailing market rates noting the practical infeasibility of the 
Government’s proffered interpretation.130 Justice Alito argued that a rule 
requiring parties and courts to calculate the cost to the firm of the 
paralegal’s services would be extremely difficult to administer—requiring 
complex accounting judgments about how to factor in the benefits and 
other perks that form a significant part of a law firm’s compensation to 
its paralegals and other staff.131 The Court noted that market rates, by 
contrast, provide a “transparent” and comparatively simple basis for 
calculating the amount to which a prevailing party is entitled.132 Thus, in 
the Court’s view: “It strains credulity that Congress would have 
abandoned this predictable, workable framework for the uncertain and 
complex accounting requirements that a cost-based rule would inflict on 
litigants, their attorneys, administrative agencies, and the courts.”133 
Justice Thomas’s dissenting opinion in Altria Group, Inc. v. Good134 
provides a more extreme example of an administrability-focused 
practical consequences argument. The issue in Altria was whether the 
 
 124. Id. at 1827 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 125. Id. at 1826–28. 
 126. 128 S. Ct. 2007 (2008). 
 127. 5 U.S.C. § 504(a)(l) (2006); 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A) (2006). 
 128. Richlin Sec. Serv. Co., 128 S. Ct. at 2010. 
 129. Id. at 2010–11. 
 130. Id. at 2018. 
 131. Id. at 2018–19. 
 132. Id. at 2019. 
 133. Id. 
 134. 129 S. Ct. 538 (2008). 
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Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act (FCLAA),135 which 
preempts state laws “based on smoking and health,” barred respondents’ 
lawsuit claiming that Altria violated the Maine Unfair Trade Practices 
Act (MUTPA) by fraudulently advertising that its “light” cigarettes 
delivered less tar and nicotine than regular brands.136 The majority ruled 
that the MUTPA claims were not preempted because they were based 
on the cigarette manufacturer’s duty not to deceive—a duty which itself 
is not based on smoking and health.137 The Court’s interpretation relied 
heavily on the reasoning of a prior case, Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 
which had established the relevant preemption inquiry to be “whether 
the legal duty that is the predicate of the common-law damages action 
constitutes a ‘requirement or prohibition based on smoking and 
health.’”138 Justice Thomas’s dissenting opinion in Altria, joined by 
Justices Roberts, Alito, and Scalia, argued, in classic administrability-
concern mode, that the Cipollone rule should be abandoned, because it 
had proved unduly confusing and unworkable over the years.139 Justice 
Thomas agreed with the district court that lower courts “remain divided 
about what the decision means and how to apply it.”140 Noting that “stare 
decisis considerations carry little weight” when a governing decision has 
created “an unworkable legal regime,” the dissenters maintained that it 
was high time for the Court to replace its current interpretation of the 
FCLAA’s preemption provision with a practicably feasible one.141 
5. Individual Justices and the Coherence Divide 
This subpart examines the Justices’ individual rates of reliance for 
the various interpretive tools in the statutory opinions he or she authored 
during the 2005–2008 Terms—including all majority, concurring, 
dissenting, and splintered partial opinions. I focus on opinions authored, 
rather than merely joined, by each Justice on the theory that the Justices 
have greater control over which interpretive resources to reference when 
they author opinions than they do when they only sign on to one. 
Table 2 lists the individual Justices’ rates of reliance for each 
interpretive tool measured in the study. The total number of opinions 
authored by each Justice also is listed. Table 3 ranks the interpretive 
tools used most frequently by each Justice. Table 4 lists each Justice’s 
rates of reference, in the opinions he or she authored, for particular 
forms of practical consequences. The references are subdivided into 
 
 135. 15 U.S.C. § 1334(b) (2006). 
 136. Altria Grp., 129 S. Ct. at 541 (citing Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 5, § 207 (2008)). 
 137. Id. at 546. 
 138. 505 U.S. 504, 524 (1992). 
 139. Altria Grp.,129 S. Ct. at 551, 554–55. 
 140. Id. at 555 (quoting Good v. Altria Grp., Inc., 436 F. Supp. 2d 132, 142 (Me. 2006)). 
 141. Id. (quoting FEC v. Wis. Right to Life, Inc., 551 U.S. 449, 500 (2007) (Scalia, J., concurring in 
part and concurring in judgment)) (citing Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 827 (1991)). 
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administrability versus policy constancy-type concerns and the rates are 
expressed as a percentage of the total number of opinions in which each 
Justice used practical consequences as an interpretive tool. Table 5 
reports the landscape-coherence Justices’ overall rates of reference, as a 
group, to administrability versus policy constancy concerns, as well as the 
statute-specific coherence Justices’ overall rates of reference, as a group, 
to each category of practical consequence concerns. Again, the numbers 
are low, so it is important to focus on large-scale trends rather than 
precise percentages. 











 142. * Indicates that one-way ANOVA test, using Bonferroni multiple comparison test, reveals a 
significant difference between rates of reliance by different Justices in the opinions they authored at 
p < .001. (For Purpose, p =.0004; for Intent, p < .0001; and for Legislative History, p = .0001). 
Canons/ Interpretive 
Tools 
Scalia Thomas Alito Roberts Kennedy 
(n = 41) (n = 47) (n = 32) (n = 26) (n = 30) 
Text/Plain Meaning* 61.0% 66.0% 62.5% 50.0% 43.3% 




7.3% 14.9% 15.6% 19.2% 13.3% 
Other Statutes 26.8% 19.1% 43.8% 30.8% 23.3% 
Common Law 17.1% 10.6% 6.3% 11.5% 3.3% 
Substantive Canons 9.7% 14.9% 15.6% 30.8% 13.3% 
Whole Act Rule 24.4% 34.0% 28.1% 46.1% 23.3% 
Agency Deference 14.6% 2.1% 6.3% 0.0% 10.0% 
Supreme Court 
Precedent 34.1% 44.7% 34.4% 53.9% 56.7% 
Practical 
Consequences 29.2% 14.9% 31.3% 38.5% 43.3% 
Purpose* 7.3% 14.9% 31.3% 11.5% 43.3% 
Intent* 2.4% 6.4% 25.0% 7.7% 10.0% 
Legislative History* 9.8% 8.5% 15.6% 18.2% 20.0% 
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Despite this limitation, the data reveal a striking divide between the 
members of the Roberts Court over the interpretive sources they most 
often choose to reference when authoring a statutory opinion. All of the 
Justices except Justices Alito, Ginsburg and Breyer referenced text/plain 
meaning and Supreme Court precedent more frequently than any of the 
other interpretive tools.143 This hardly is shocking, as text and precedent 
are the two most conventional legal resources, and the Justices may 
regularly refer to them to legitimate the Court’s statutory decisions and 
to create a public perception of neutral decisionmaking.144 Once we look 
beyond these two conventional legal resources, the Justices’ patterns of 
reliance fall rather neatly into the two interpretive camps described in 
this Article: legal-landscape versus statute-specific coherence. Specifically, 
the opinions authored by Justices Scalia, Thomas, Roberts, Kennedy, 
and Alito exhibited the highest rates of reliance for interpretive tools 
that promote legal-landscape coherence—that is, other statutes, the 
dictionary rule, and practical consequences emphasizing administrability-
based concerns.145 At the same time, the opinions authored by Justices 
Souter, Ginsburg, Breyer, and Stevens exhibited the highest rates of 
reliance on interpretive tools that promote statute-specific coherence—
 
 143. See infra Table 3. 
 144. See, e.g., sources cited supra note 68. 
 145. See supra Table 2; infra Table 3. 
Canons/ Interpretive 
Tools 
Souter Ginsburg Breyer Stevens 
(n = 34) (n = 33) (n = 48) (n = 47) 
Text/Plain Meaning* 47.1% 33.3% 20.8% 46.8% 




5.9% 6.1% 8.3% 6.4% 
Other Statutes 23.5% 27.3% 20.8% 19.1% 
Common Law 14.7% 0.0% 4.2% 17.0% 
Substantive Canons 14.7% 12.1% 8.3% 27.7% 
Whole Act Rule 32.4% 30.3% 18.8% 21.3% 
Agency Deference 11.8% 9.1% 12.5% 8.5% 
Supreme Court 
Precedent 55.9% 48.5% 41.7% 51.1% 
Practical 
Consequences 32.4% 51.5% 39.6% 31.9% 
Purpose* 17.7% 39.4% 37.5% 29.8% 
Intent* 23.5% 24.2% 27.1% 46.8% 
Legislative History* 29.4% 36.4% 37.5% 38.3% 
Krishnakumar_62-HLJ-221.doc (Do Not Delete) 1/13/2011 10:43 AM 
252 HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 62:221 
that is, legislative history, purpose, intent, and practical consequences 
focused on policy constancy concerns.146 
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As Tables 2 and 3 illustrate, the lines dividing the two camps, while 
stark, are not absolute. Two Justices in each camp showed noteworthy 
crossover reliance on interpretive tools that promote the opposite camp’s 
approach. Justices Kennedy and Alito exhibited relatively high rates of 
reliance on statutory purpose, and Justice Alito also relied with notable 
frequency on legislative intent, while Justices Souter and Ginsburg 
exhibited noteworthy rates of reliance on other statutes and Justice 
Stevens exhibited a noteworthy rate of reliance on substantive canons. 
Significantly, the landscape-coherence Justices were far less inclined 
to reference interpretive tools that promote statute-specific coherence 
than the statute-specific coherence Justices were to employ landscape-
coherence promoting interpretive tools. Justice Scalia, for example, 
exhibited remarkably low rates of reliance—less than 10%—for the three 
most distinctly statute-specific coherence-promoting interpretive tools: 
purpose, intent, and legislative history.147 Justice Thomas exhibited 
similarly low rates of reliance on intent and legislative history, and only a 
slightly higher rate of reliance on purpose.148 Justice Roberts’s rates of 
reliance on the statute-specific coherence-promoting interpretive tools 
 
 147. See supra Table 2 (reporting that Justice Scalia referenced legislative history in 9.8% of the 
opinions he authored; statutory purpose in 7.3% of the opinions he authored; and legislative intent in 
2.4% of the opinions he authored). 
 148. See supra Table 2 (reporting that Justice Thomas referenced legislative history in 8.5% of the 
opinions he authored; statutory purpose in 14.9% of the opinions he authored; and legislative intent in 
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were marginally higher than Justice Scalia’s and Justice Thomas’s, but 
still were extremely low.149 
By contrast, each of the statute-specific coherence Justices exhibited 
non-marginal rates of reliance on at least one landscape-coherence 
promoting tool. Justices Souter and Stevens, for example, relied 
somewhat frequently—and at rates comparable to the landscape-
coherence Justices—on substantive canons and common law precedent.150 
Further, each Justice in the statute-specific coherence camp referenced 
other statutes in roughly 20% of the opinions he or she authored.151 As 
Table 3 shows, the statute-specific coherence Justices relied with less 
frequency on landscape-coherence tools than they did on the statute-
specific coherence tools, but they did not reject the landscape coherence 
tools the way that the landscape-coherence Justices rejected most of the 
statute-specific coherence tools. Indeed, for the top two landscape-
coherence promoting interpretive tools—other statutes and the 
dictionary—the statute-specific coherence Justices’ rates of reliance, 
while lower than the landscape-coherence Justices’ rates, did not fall 
below 10%, or even below 15% in most cases, unlike Justices Scalia’s, 
Thomas’s, and Roberts’s rates of reliance on the top two or three statute-
specific coherence-promoting interpretive tools.152 The reasons for this 
difference in the two camps’ willingness to rely on canons and tools 
promoting the other camp’s preferred interpretive approach are unclear. 
It could be that Justice Scalia’s rants against the use of legislative history, 
intent, or purpose in interpreting statutes have influenced Justices 
Thomas and Roberts and, to a lesser extent, Justices Alito and Kennedy, 
to diminish or eliminate their reliance on these interpretive tools.153 
Another possibility is that the Justices who prioritize statute-specific 
coherence also are concerned with ensuring a coherent legal landscape, 
as long as the two kinds of coherence are not in conflict. Alternatively, 
the statute-specific coherence-leaning Justices may find it necessary to 
use some landscape-coherence oriented tools in their opinions in order to 
win or retain the votes of their landscape-oriented colleagues—
particularly those landscape-coherence Justices who exhibit little affinity 
 
 149. See supra Table 2 (reporting that Justice Roberts referenced legislative history in 18.2% of 
the opinions he authored; statutory purpose in 11.5% of the opinions he authored; and legislative 
intent in 7.7% of the opinions he authored). 
 150. See supra Table 2 (reporting that Justice Souter referenced both substantive canons and 
common law precedent in 14.7% of the opinions he authored, and that Justice Stevens referenced 
substantive canons in 27.7% of the opinions he authored and common law precedent in 17% of the 
opinions he authored). 
 151. See supra Table 2. 
 152. See supra Table 3. 
 153. But see Law & Zaring, supra note 6, at 1728–29 (finding no evidence to support a “Scalia 
effect” diminishing other Justices’ use of legislative history). 
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for the statute-specific coherence canons (such as Roberts, Scalia, and 
Thomas). 
In a related vein, the data suggest something of an inverse 
relationship between judicial references to dictionary definitions on the 
one hand, and legislative history on the other. Those Justices who 
exhibited the highest rates of reference to dictionary definitions— 
Justices Thomas, Alito, and Scalia—also exhibited the lowest rates of 
reliance on legislative history.154 Similarly, those Justices who exhibited 
the highest rates of reliance on legislative history—Justices Stevens, 
Breyer, Ginsburg, and Souter—exhibited the lowest rates of reference to 
dictionary definitions.155 The exceptions, again, are crossover Justice 
Roberts, who exhibited a low rate of reliance on the dictionary and also a 
medium-low rate of reliance on legislative history,156 and Justice 
Kennedy, who exhibited comparable rates of reliance on both 
interpretive tools.157 These differences in rates of reliance highlight the 
fact that resort to dictionary definitions and resort to legislative history 
reflect two very different philosophical approaches to statutory 
construction. To date, scholars have viewed the battle between 
dictionary and legislative history use as part of the mythical divide 
between textualist and intentionalist judges.158 But the empirical and 
doctrinal analysis presented in this Article suggests an alternative 
explanation for the split. Perhaps the judicial divide is not so much over 
text versus intent but, rather, over the relevant context for ensuring 
statutory coherence. For those Justices who define coherence as 
 
 154. Justice Thomas referenced dictionary definitions in 29.8% of the opinions he authored but 
referenced legislative history in only 8.5% of those opinions; Justice Alito referenced the dictionary in 
28.1% of the cases he authored and legislative history in only 15.6% of the cases; Justice Scalia 
referenced the dictionary in 22% of the cases he authored and legislative history in only 9.8% of his 
opinions. See supra Table 2. 
 155. Justice Stevens invoked legislative history in 38.3% of the opinions he authored but relied on 
the dictionary in only 11.9% of his opinions; Justice Breyer referenced legislative history in 37.5% of 
the opinions he authored and the dictionary in only 14.3% of those opinions; Justice Ginsburg 
referenced legislative history in 36.4% of her opinions and the dictionary in 15.2% of those same 
opinions; and Justice Souter invoked legislative history in 29.4% of his opinions, while citing the 
dictionary in 17.7%. See supra Table 2. 
 156. Justice Roberts referenced the dictionary in only 11.5% of the opinions he authored—the 
lowest rate of reliance for any Justice, though essentially equal to Justice Stevens’s rate of reliance—
and invoked legislative history in 18.2% of the opinions he authored—more than all of the other 
landscape-coherence Justices, save Justice Kennedy, but only half as often as most of the statute-
specific Justices. See supra Table 2. 
 157. Justice Kennedy invoked the dictionary in 23.3% of the cases he authored and legislative 
history in 20%. See supra Table 2. 
 158. See, e.g., Scalia, supra note 1, at 32; see also Abbe R. Gluck, The States as Laboratories of 
Statutory Interpretation: Methodological Consensus and the New Modified Textualism, 119 Yale L.J. 
1750, 1762–64 (2010); Merrill, supra note 4, at 355–61; Schacter, supra note 8, at 5 (calling dictionary 
references the “benchmark of the new textualism” and contrasting an apparent decline in dictionary 
citations with an apparent “resurgence” in legislative history use).  
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consistency across the legal landscape, the dictionary, as a surrogate 
Code of Federal Definitions (or Code of Legal Custom, in the case of 
Black’s Law Dictionary), is an ideal gap-filler; while for those Justices 
who define coherence as consistency in the specific statute’s application 
to like situations and across time, legislative history illuminating the 
statute’s path of evolution is the better gap-filling interpretive aid. 
Table 4: Individual Justices’ Rates of Reliance on Different 
Practical Consequences Types159 
 
Tables 4 and 5 are particularly telling, revealing a sharp contrast 
between the kinds of practical consequences that the landscape- versus 
statute-specific coherence Justices tended to reference. When they 
invoked practical consequences to interpret a statute, Justices Scalia, 
Thomas, and Alito employed administrability type arguments over 70% 
of the time and policy constancy arguments less than one-third of the 
 
 159. * Indicates chi-squared test reveals a significant difference between the rates at which the 
different Justices referenced administrability versus policy constancy practical consequences concerns 
at p = .001. Not including per curiam opinions, the Justices referenced some sort of practical 
consequence in 114 of their opinions in statutory cases. 
Justices* 











Both Types of 
Concerns 
Scalia (n = 12) 75.0% 16.7% 8.3% 
Thomas (n = 7) 71.4% 28.6% 0.0% 
Alito (n = 10) 70.0% 30.0% 0.0% 
Roberts (n = 10) 50.0% 50.0% 0.0% 
Kennedy (n = 13) 53.8% 46.2% 0.0% 
Souter (n = 11) 9.1% 81.8% 9.1% 
Ginsburg (n = 17) 5.9% 88.2% 5.9% 
Breyer (n = 19) 26.3% 68.4% 5.3% 
Stevens (n = 15) 6.7% 93.3% 0.0% 
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time.160 Justices Roberts and Kennedy were less sharp in their 
preferences for administrability-type concerns, referencing the two 
categories of practical consequences at roughly equal rates. Statute-
specific coherence Justices Souter, Ginsburg, and Stevens, by contrast, 
referenced policy constancy type concerns in over 80% of the cases in 
which they invoked practical considerations to interpret a statute and 
referenced administrability concerns in less than 20% of those cases.161 
Justice Breyer’s numbers were only slightly less stark. He referenced 
policy constancy arguments in nearly 70% of the cases and 
administrability concerns in less than one-third of the cases.162 
Interestingly, it appears from this data that the statute-specific coherence 
Justices are more averse to administrability arguments than are the 
landscape-coherence Justices to policy constancy arguments. 
Table 5: Roberts Court’s Rates of Reliance on Different Practical 












Justices (n = 52) 




Justices (n = 62) 
12.9% 82.3% 4.8% 
Per Curiam 
(n = 3) 33.3% 66.7% 0.0% 
 
Table 5 shows similar figures when all practical consequences-
referencing opinions authored by the landscape-coherence Justices are 
grouped together (of 52 such opinions, 63.5% reference administrability 
concerns and 34.6% reference policy constancy concerns), and when all 
practical consequences-referencing opinions authored by the statute-
specific coherence Justices are grouped together (of 62 such opinions, 
 
 160. See supra Table 4. 
 161. See supra Table 4. 
 162. See supra Table 4. 
 163. * Indicates chi-squared test reveals a significant difference between the rates at which the two 
camps/groups of Justices referenced administrability versus policy constancy practical consequences 
concerns at p < .0001. Including per curiam opinions, the Justices referenced some sort of practical 
consequence in 117 of their opinions in statutory cases. 
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82.3% reference policy constancy concerns, while only 12.9% reference 
administrability concerns).164 
6. Statutory Subject Matter and the Interpretive Tools 
In addition to the individual Justices’ rates of reliance on landscape- 
versus statute-specific coherence tools, I also sought to measure the 
correlation, if any, between statutory subject matter and the Roberts 
Court’s reliance on particular interpretive sources. Each opinion in the 
dataset was coded for its subject matter according to the following 
categories: (1) criminal statutes; (2) environmental statutes; 
(3) jurisdictional statutes; (4) the Internal Revenue Code; (5) the Federal 
Arbitration Act; (6) discrimination-related statutes; (7) the IDEA; 
(8) civil RICO; (9) securities statutes; (10) antitrust statutes; (11) 
preemption statutes; (12) the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA); (13) the 
Bankruptcy Code; (14) immigration statutes; (15) ERISA; (16) the 
Federal Communications Act; (17) the Prison Litigation Reform Act; 
(18) the Patent Act; (19) the False Claims Act; (20) the Anti-Terrorism 
and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA); (21) the Federal Employers 
Liability Act (FELA); and (22) other statutes. It turned out that several 
of these statutes/subject areas were interpreted in only a few of the 
opinions in the dataset.165 In order to avoid generalizing from very small 
numbers, only those statutory subject areas that were interpreted in at 
least nine opinions in the dataset were included in the tables and analysis 
below.166 
The results are reported in Tables 6a to 6d, 7a to 7d, and 8a to 8c. 
As the tables indicate, the data suggest that the camp-transcendent 
interpretive tools are also subject-matter transcendent: practical 
consequences, Supreme Court precedent, the whole act rule, and 
text/plain meaning all were referenced frequently across statute types.167 
“Other statutes” also was referenced frequently across statute types, with 
 
 164. See supra Table 5. 
 165. The dataset contained only 7 cases and 8 opinions interpreting the Internal Revenue Code; 3 
cases and 8 opinions interpreting the IDEA; 6 cases and 8 opinions interpreting antitrust statutes; 2 
cases and 5 opinions interpreting the FTCA; 4 cases and 3 opinions interpreting the Bankruptcy Code; 
2 cases and 7 opinions interpreting the Federal Communications Act; 2 cases and 4 opinions 
interpreting the Prison Litigation Reform Act; 3 cases and 7 opinions interpreting the Patent Act; 3 
cases and 4 opinions interpreting the False Claims Act; 4 cases and 6 opinions interpreting the 
AEDPA; and 2 cases and 6 opinions interpreting the FELA. 
 166. As Tables 6a–d, 7a–d, and 8a–c indicate, the subject areas for which correlation was assessed 
were: criminal statutes (53 opinions), environmental statutes (24 opinions), jurisdictional statutes (50 
opinions), the Federal Arbitration Act (11 opinions), discrimination-related statutes (49 opinions), the 
civil RICO statute (9 opinions), securities statutes (9 opinions), preemption statutes (22 opinions), 
immigration statutes (13 opinions), and ERISA (10 opinions).  
 167. See infra Tables 6a, 6b, 6c, and 6d. 
Krishnakumar_62-HLJ-221.doc (Do Not Delete) 1/13/2011 10:43 AM 
December 2010]    ROBERTS COURT’S FIRST ERA 259 
the exception of opinions interpreting environmental statutes and 
ERISA.168 
The statutes that provoked the most frequent references to 
landscape coherence interpretive tools were criminal statutes,169 civil 
RICO,170 and immigration statutes.171 Preemption and securities statutes 
also provoked notable rates of reference to two of the four landscape-
coherence tools,172 although the total number of opinions available for 
analysis in the securities area makes it difficult to place much weight on 
these figures. As for the statute-specific interpretive tools, the statutory 
subject matters that provoked the most frequent rates of reference were 
criminal statutes,173 environmental statutes,174 discrimination-related 
statutes,175 securities statutes,176 and, to a lesser extent, jurisdictional 
statutes,177 civil RICO,178 and preemption statutes.179 
 
 168. See infra Table 7a. 
 169. Of the 53 Roberts Court opinions in the dataset involving the interpretation of a criminal 
statute, 39.6% referenced other statutes, 26.4% referenced the dictionary, and 17% referenced 
substantive canons. See infra Tables 7a, 7b, and 7d. 
 170. Of the 9 Roberts Court opinions in the dataset that involved the interpretation of the civil 
RICO statute, 33.3% referenced other statutes, 22.2% referenced the dictionary, and 22.2% 
referenced common law precedent. See infra Tables 7a, 7b, and 7c. 
 171. Of the 13 Roberts Court opinions in the dataset that involved the interpretation of an 
immigration statute, 30.8% referenced other statutes, 23.1% referenced the dictionary, and 23.1% 
referenced common law precedent. See infra Tables 7a, 7b, and 7c. 
 172. Twenty-two Roberts Court opinions in the dataset involved the interpretation of a 
preemption statute; of these, 22.7% referenced other statutes and 22.7% referenced substantive 
canons. 9 opinions from the dataset involved the interpretation of a securities statute; of these, 22.2% 
referenced other statutes and 22.2% referenced common law precedent. See infra Tables 7a, 7c, and 
7d. 
 173. The Roberts Court’s opinions interpreting criminal statutes referenced legislative history at a 
rate of 30.2%, referenced intent at a rate of 24.5%, and referenced statutory purpose at a rate of 17%. 
See infra Tables 8a, 8b, and 8c. 
 174. Of the 24 Roberts Court opinions in the dataset that involved the interpretation of an 
environmental statute, 20.8% referenced legislative history, 20.8% referenced intent, and 37.5% 
referenced statutory purpose. See infra Tables 8a, 8b, and 8c. 
 175. Of the 49 Roberts Court opinions in the dataset that involved the interpretation of a 
discrimination-related statute, 30.6% referenced legislative history, 22.4% referenced intent, and 
20.4% referenced statutory purpose. See infra Tables 8a, 8b, and 8c. 
 176. Of the 9 Roberts Court opinions in the dataset that involved the interpretation of a securities 
statute, 33.3% referenced legislative history, 33.3% referenced intent, and 44.4% referenced purpose. 
See infra Tables 8a, 8b, and 8c. 
 177. Of the 50 Roberts Court opinions in the dataset that involved the interpretation of a 
jurisdictional statute, 20% referenced legislative history and 24% referenced statutory purpose. See 
infra Tables 8a and 8c. 
 178. Of the 9 Roberts Court opinions in the dataset that involved the interpretation of the civil 
RICO statute, 22.2% referenced legislative history and 22.2% referenced statutory purpose. See infra 
Tables 8a and 8c. 
 179. Of the 22 Roberts Court opinions in the dataset that involved the interpretation of a 
preemption statute, 31.8% referenced intent and 40.9% referenced statutory purpose. See infra Tables 
8b and 8c. 
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It is difficult to generalize from these figures, but a few trends are 
apparent. First, the data and tables indicate that, on the whole, the 
Roberts Court tends to employ statute-specific coherence tools more 
frequently than it does landscape-coherence tools when construing 
environmental and discrimination-related statutes, although the Court 
references one landscape-coherence tool—dictionary definitions—
frequently when construing environmental statutes.180 The same is true to 
a lesser extent for jurisdictional statutes.181 Conversely, landscape-
coherence tools tend to be the Court’s preferred interpretive aids when it 
construes immigration statutes, although references to statutory purpose 
also are common in the Court’s immigration opinions.182 Second, the 
Court tends to call upon the full gamut of interpretive tools, both 
landscape and statute-specific, when interpreting criminal statutes,183 
preemption statutes,184 securities statutes,185 and the civil RICO statute.186 
 
 180. Compare Tables 8a–c (opinions interpreting environmental statutes referenced legislative 
history at a rate of 20.8%, intent at a rate of 20.8%, and statutory purpose at a rate of 37.5%; opinions 
interpreting discrimination-related statutes referenced legislative history at a rate of 30.6%, intent at a 
rate of 22.4%, and statutory purpose at a rate of 20.4%) with Tables 7a–d (opinions interpreting 
environmental statutes referenced other statutes at a rate of 4.2%, dictionary definitions at a rate of 
41.7%, common law precedent at a rate of 4.2%, and substantive canons at a rate of 8.3%; opinions 
interpreting discrimination-related statutes referenced other statutes at a rate of 20.4%, dictionary 
definitions at a rate of 10.2%, common law precedent at a rate of 6.1%, and substantive canons at a 
rate of 14.3%). 
 181. Compare Tables 8a–c (opinions interpreting jurisdictional statutes referenced legislative 
history at a rate of 20%, intent at a rate of 14%, and statutory purpose at a rate of 24%), with Tables 
7a–d (opinions interpreting jurisdictional statutes referenced other statutes at a rate of 22%, dictionary 
definitions at a rate of 12%, common law precedent at a rate of 6%, and substantive canons at a rate 
of 8%). 
 182. Compare Tables 8a–c (opinions interpreting immigration statutes referenced legislative 
history at a rate of 7.7%, intent at a rate of 7.7%, and statutory purpose at a rate of 30.8%), with 
Tables 7a–d (opinions interpreting immigration statutes referenced other statutes at a rate of 30.8%, 
dictionary definitions at a rate of 23.1%, common law precedent at a rate of 23.1%, and substantive 
canons at a rate of 7.7%). 
 183. See Tables 8a–c and Tables 7a–d (opinions interpreting criminal statutes referenced legislative 
history at a rate of 30.2%, intent at a rate of 24.5%, and statutory purpose at a rate of 17%; other 
statutes were referenced at a rate of 39.6%, dictionary definitions at a rate of 26.4%, common law 
precedent at a rate of 7.5%, and substantive canons at a rate of 17%). 
 184. See Tables 8a–c and Tables 7a–d (opinions interpreting preemption statutes referenced 
legislative history at a rate of 18.2%, intent at a rate of 31.8%, and statutory purpose at a rate of 
40.9%; other statutes were referenced at a rate of 22.7%, dictionary definitions at a rate of 9.1%, 
common law precedent at a rate of 9.1%, and substantive canons at a rate of 22.7%). 
 185. See Tables 8a–c and Tables 7a–d (opinions interpreting securities statutes referenced 
legislative history at a rate of 33.3%, intent at a rate of 33.3%, and statutory purpose at a rate of 
44.4%; other statutes were referenced at a rate of 22.2%, dictionary definitions at a rate of 11.1%, 
common law precedent at a rate of 22.2%, and substantive canons at a rate of 11.1%). 
 186. See Tables 8a–c and Tables 7a–d (opinions interpreting the civil RICO statute referenced 
legislative history at a rate of 22.2%, intent at a rate of 11.1%, and statutory purpose at a rate of 
22.2%; other statutes were referenced at a rate of 33.3%, dictionary definitions at a rate of 22.2%, 
common law precedent at a rate of 22.2%, and substantive canons at a rate of 11.1%). 
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Again, given the size of the dataset, it is important to focus on 
overall trends rather than precise percentages. But even staying at the 
big-picture level, the data about statutory subject matter is intriguing. 
Why does the Roberts Court tend to employ statute-specific rather than 
landscape coherence tools when interpreting environmental, 
discrimination-related and, to some extent, jurisdictional statutes? It is 
possible that these statutes are more complicated or are viewed as 
greater breaks from the preexisting legal regime than is the average 
statute; or perhaps environmental, discrimination-related, and 
jurisdictional statutes have more developed legislative records and 
purposes than do other statutes. Perhaps they were, on the whole, 
enacted by very liberal Congresses. Future work examining the Court’s 
interpretive tool reliance by statutory subject matter can and should 
explore such possibilities. 
III.  Illustrative Case Studies 
The reader might be left wondering what all of these statistics mean 
on the level of the individual case. Specifically, she may question whether 
the Roberts Court’s statutory cases are characterized by clean face-offs 
between landscape-coherence canons in the majority opinions and 
statute-specific coherence canons in the dissenting opinions, and whether 
the subject matter of a statute is a definitive predictor of which 
interpretive tools the Court will employ in construing the statute. The 
short answer to such questions is that the statistical evidence is not nearly 
so black-and-white. For one thing, the two interpretive approaches are 
not always in tension—indeed, landscape- and statute-specific coherence 
often both point towards and can be achieved by the same construction 
of a statute.187 Further, some of the Justices exhibit crossover tendencies 
to reference one or more of the opposing camp’s preferred interpretive 
tools.188 And while statutory subject matter may play some role in the 
Court’s choice of which interpretive aids to consult, the data reported 
above hardly indicate that this role is a definitive one. 
In highlighting the Justices’ interpretive divide, I do not mean to 
suggest that every statutory case neatly and exclusively relies on either 
legal-landscape coherence-fostering interpretive tools or statute-specific 
coherence-fostering tools. My intention in this Article is merely to point 
out that: (1) different interpretive canons and tools push towards 
different kinds of coherence; (2) the Justices, in their common law 
approach to construing statutes, very much evince an interpretive goal of 
 
 187. See, e.g., Dean v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 1849, 1856–60 (2009) (Stevens, J., dissenting) 
(making both statute-specific legislative history and design arguments and landscape-focused common 
law and substantive canon arguments). 
 188. See Tables 2 and 3 and discussion supra Part II.C.5. 
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creating coherence in the law, whether in the legal landscape writ large 
or in the specific policy of the individual statute; and (3) when landscape-
coherence oriented interpretive tools point to a different interpretation 
than do the interpretive tools that focus on the specific statute at issue, 
the Justices are likely to split along fairly identifiable lines in their 
statutory constructions. This Part examines a few non-unanimous cases 
from the dataset to illustrate how the Court’s interpretive divide works in 
practice. 
A. LIMTIACO V. CAMACHO 
The first example, Limtiaco v. Camacho,189 is a 2006 Term case in 
which the Court divided 5-4 over the proper interpretation of the debt-
limitation provision of the Organic Act of Guam.190 The Guam legislature 
had authorized Guam’s governor to issue bonds to fund the territory’s 
continuing debt obligations.191 Guam’s attorney general refused to sign 
off on the bond contracts, arguing that the bond issuance would violate 
the debt-limitation provision of the Act, which limits the territory’s 
public indebtedness to 10% of the “aggregate tax valuation of the 
property in Guam.”192 The statutory question before the Supreme Court 
was whether Guam’s debt limitation must be calculated according to the 
assessed or to the appraised valuation of property in Guam.193 A divided 
Court ruled that the debt-limitation must be calculated based on the 
assessed valuation.194 
Justice Thomas’s opinion, joined by Justices Roberts, Scalia, 
Kennedy, and Breyer, relied heavily on landscape-coherence oriented 
interpretive tools to reach and justify its construction of the statute. First, 
he referenced Black’s Law Dictionary—an external, non-statute-specific 
source of legal definitions and custom—to determine that “‘tax 
valuation’ most naturally means the value to which the tax rate is 
applied[,]”195 which in turn translates to the “‘assessed valuation,’ a term 
consistently defined as a valuation of property for purposes of 
taxation.”196 The Court also tied a plain-meaning argument to its 
dictionary references, holding that the term tax valuation “most naturally 
means the value to which the tax rate is applied.”197 
 
 189. 549 U.S. 483 (2007). 
 190. 48 U.S.C. § 1423a (2006); 11 Guam Code Ann. § 24102 (1998). 
 191. Limtiaco, 549 U.S. at 485. 
 192. 48 U.S.C. § 1423a; Limtiaco, 549 U.S. at 485. 
 193. Limtiaco, 549 U.S. at 485. 
 194. Id. 
 195. Id. at 489 
 196. Id. (quoting Black’s Law Dictionary 1721, 149 (4th ed. 1951)). 
 197. Id. 
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The Court then made a second classic legal-landscape oriented 
interpretive move, arguing that “[o]ur interpretation comports with most 
States’ practice of tying the debt limitations of municipalities to assessed 
valuation,” and that “[s]tates that depart from the majority approach use 
clear language to do so.”198 In other words, the Court chose to interpret 
the statute in the manner most consistent with existing legal practice, 
emphasizing that its chosen construction fit snugly alongside the other 
pieces of the legal landscape puzzle (or, most states’ practices). 
In dissent, Justice Souter, joined by Justices Stevens, Ginsburg, and 
Alito, took a classically statute-specific interpretive approach. The 
dissent disagreed with the majority’s argument that the term “tax 
valuation” unambiguously referred to the assessed value and contended 
that it, therefore, was proper to consult the statute’s purpose.199 
Congress’s purpose in enacting the debt limitation, the dissent argued, 
was to restrict the Guam government’s ability to incur “crushing” 
amounts of debt that would be shouldered by future generations and 
ultimately, could require a bailout from the United States government.200 
Combining purpose with practical consequence considerations, the 
dissent concluded that the only construction that could fulfill the statute’s 
policy objectives was one that tied the debt limitation to Guam’s capacity 
to tax property—that is, appraised or market value.201 The dissent made 
the practical observation that “[t]he actual, market value of property is 
the only economic index of Guam’s ability to collect property taxes to 
pay its bills, the only figure under consideration that is fixed in the real 
world, and the only figure that provides a genuine limitation.”202 Further, 
the dissent hypothesized that because assessed value is determined based 
on the tax rate set by the Guam legislature, an interpretation that tied 
the debt-limitation to the assessed value would enable the Guam 
legislature to manipulate the tax rate in order to affect the assessed 
valuation and hence, to manipulate the debt limit.203 In other words, the 
practical consequences of the majority’s interpretation would be to 
render the debt limitation provision meaningless—a classic policy 
constancy-type practical consequences argument. Thus, while the 
majority opinion looked outward to common state practice and 
conventional legal definitions to give meaning to the statute at issue, the 
dissent looked inward to the purpose of the individual statute and to 
 
 198. Id. at 491 (emphasis added) (citing 15 E. McQuillin, Law of Municipal Corporations 
§ 41:7, at 422, 424–25 (3d ed. rev. 2005)). 
 199. Id. at 492 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
 200. Id. at 495. 
 201. See id. at 495–96. 
 202. Id. at 496. 
 203. Id. at 495. 
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practical realities, suggesting that the majority’s interpretation was likely 
to render the statute’s policy hollow. 
Given the trajectories taken by the majority and dissenting opinions 
and the individual Justices’ preferences for particular interpretive tools, 
Justice Alito’s crossover to join the policy-coherence-focused dissenting 
opinion is not surprising. At least based on his rates of reliance in the 
opinions he authored, Justice Alito seems to consider statutory purpose 
an important interpretive resource.204 Justice Breyer’s crossover vote to 
join the landscape-coherence focused majority opinion is a little more 
surprising, though not incomprehensible, as the data in Table 2 indicate 
some inclination on his part to reference dictionary definitions in the 
opinions he authors.205 
B. RAPANOS V. UNITED STATES 
The second case study is Rapanos v. United States,206 a 2006 case in 
which the Court splintered by a 4-1-4 margin in construing the Clean 
Water Act (CWA).207 Michigan landowner John Rapanos backfilled 
wetlands on a parcel of land that he owned.208 The Army Corps of 
Engineers, which administers much of the CWA, informed Mr. Rapanos 
that his wetlands were “waters of the United States” and could not be 
backfilled without a permit.209 The CWA makes it unlawful to discharge 
certain material into “navigable waters” without a permit210 and defines 
“navigable waters” as “the waters of the United States, including the 
territorial seas.”211 The Army Corps had, for years, interpreted “waters of 
the United States” expansively to include not only traditional navigable 
waters, but also “tributaries” and wetlands “adjacent” to navigable 
waters and tributaries.212 The Supreme Court had to decide whether Mr. 
Rapanos’s wetlands, which lay near ditches or man-made drains that 
eventually emptied into traditional navigable waters, constituted “waters 
of the United States” within the meaning of the CWA.213 The members of 
the Roberts Court split three ways, with a plurality concluding that the 
statute did not cover Mr. Rapanos’s wetlands.214 
Writing for four members of the Court, Justice Scalia placed 
significant emphasis on giving the CWA an interpretation that fit 
 
 204. See supra Table 2. 
 205. Id. 
 206. 547 U.S. 715 (2006) (plurality opinion). 
 207. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251–1444 (2006). 
 208. Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 719–20. 
 209. Id. at 720–21 (citing 33 U.S.C. § 1362(7)). 
 210. See 33 U.S.C. § 1344(a). 
 211. Id. § 1362(7). 
 212. Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 727–28. 
 213. Id. at 729. 
 214. Id. at 731–32. 
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coherently into the existing legal landscape and almost no emphasis on 
the specific statutory policy internal to the CWA.215 His plurality opinion 
referred extensively to dictionary definitions indicating that the statutory 
term “the waters” means “water ‘[a]s found in streams and bodies 
forming geographical features such as oceans, rivers, [and] lakes,’ or ‘the 
flowing or moving masses, as of waves or floods, making up such streams 
or bodies.’”216 All of these dictionary terms, he observed, “connote 
continuously present, fixed bodies of water, as opposed to ordinarily dry 
channels through which water occasionally or intermittently flows.”217 
Justice Scalia reinforced his reliance on the conventional meaning 
provided in dictionaries with a reference to how the term “navigable 
waters” had been interpreted in other statutes: He noted that the CWA 
adopted the “traditional phrase ‘navigable waters’” from its predecessor 
statutes218 and that the traditional understanding of “navigable waters” in 
those statutes included only discrete bodies of water.219 Justice Scalia 
supported this latter point by citing Supreme Court precedents that used 
the terms “waters” and “rivers” interchangeably and used “navigable 
waters” to mean “waterways,” arguing that “because such ‘waters’ had to 
be navigable in fact or susceptible of being rendered so, the term [could] 
not include ephemeral flows.”220 He also made a whole-act-rule argument 
emphasizing that the CWA itself characterizes the channels and conduits 
that typically carry intermittent flows of water—like the tributaries and 
wetlands at issue—as “point sources” separate and distinct from 
“navigable waters.”221 This separate internal classification, he argued, 
further showed that the watercourses through which intermittent waters 
typically flow are not “waters of the United States.”222 
Having covered the immediately adjacent legal landscape 
(dictionary conventions, past precedent, other statutes, other sections of 
the same statute), Justice Scalia next looked to ensure that the Court’s 
interpretation remained consistent with the overarching legal framework. 
 
 215. See id. 
 216. Id. at 732 (alteration in original) (quoting Webster’s New International Dictionary 2882 
(2d ed. 1954)). 
 217. Id. at 733 & n.6. 
The principal definition of ‘stream’ likewise includes reference to such permanent, 
geographically fixed bodies of water: ‘[a] current or course of water or other fluid, flowing 
on the earth, as a river, brook, etc.’ The other definitions of ‘stream’ repeatedly emphasize 
the requirement of continuous flow: ‘[a] steady flow, as of water, air, gas, or the like’; 
‘[a]nything issuing or moving with continued succession of parts’; ‘[a] continued current or 
course; current; drift.’ 
Id. (internal citations omitted). 
 218. Id. at 734. 
 219. Id. 
 220. Id. 
 221. Id. at 735 (citing 33 U.S.C. § 1362(14) (2006)). 
 222. Id. at 735–36. 
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He noted that serious constitutional issues involving the Commerce 
Clause and federalism would arise if the CWA were interpreted to give 
the Army Corps’ authority over intermittent water flows.223 The Court’s 
precedents established that the “[r]egulation of land use” is a 
“quintessential state and local power,”224 and that states possess 
“traditional and primary power over land and water use.”225 Only a 
narrow reading of the Army Corps’ regulatory authority would be 
consistent with the states’ primacy in this area; the Corps’ expansive 
definition would make it “a de facto regulator of immense stretches of 
intrastate land”226 and eliminate “virtually all” state and local planning, 
intruding impermissibly on state governments’ authority.227 Thus, both 
the avoidance canon and federalism clear-statement rules dictated that 
the Court should interpret the regulatory power conferred by the statute 
narrowly, so as not to disrupt the existing constitutional balance between 
federal and state power.228 
Justice Scalia’s opinion also contained a passing reference to the 
practical consequences worked by the Corps’ expansive interpretation. 
The opinion began by detailing the burden placed on landowners under 
existing regulations, implying that the current system is prohibitively 
expensive and time-consuming.229 “The average applicant for an 
individual permit,” Justice Scalia noted, “spends 788 days and $271,596 
in completing the process,” and “[o]ver $1.7 billion is spent each year by 
the private and public sectors obtaining wetlands permits.”230 These are 
administrability-based practical concerns, suggesting that the statutory 
question at issue was part of a larger problem with a regulatory 
landscape that was unduly burdensome and inefficient. Although this 
data about the costs landowners face in applying for a permit appears in 
the background facts section of the plurality opinion, rather than its 
statutory analysis section,231 the fact that the opinion mentions these costs 
at all—even providing hard numbers—indicates that they formed at least 
part of the plurality’s interpretive calculus. 
 
 223. See id. at 738. 
 224. Id. (citing FERC v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742, 768 n.30 (1982); Hess v. Port Auth. Trans-
Hudson Corp., 513 U.S. 30, 44 (1994)). 
 225. Id. (quoting Solid Waste Agency of N. Cook Cnty. v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 531 U.S. 
159, 174 (2001)). 
 226. Id. (emphasis omitted). 
 227. Id. at 737–38. 
 228. Id. at 738 (citing BFP v. Resolution Trust Corp., 511 U.S. 531, 544 (1994); Edward J. 
DeBartolo Corp. v. Fla. Gulf Coast Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 485 U.S. 568, 575 (1988)). 
 229. See id. at 721. 
 230. Id. (citing David Sunding & David Zilberman, The Economics of Environmental Regulation 
by Licensing: An Assessment of Recent Changes to the Wetland Permitting Process, 42 Nat. Resources 
J. 59, 74–76, 81 (2002)). 
 231. Id. at 719–22. 
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Justice Scalia’s plurality opinion was landscape-oriented in three 
important ways. First, it looked to external sources, including 
conventional dictionary meanings, other statutes, and Supreme Court 
precedents, to give meaning to the statutory term “navigable waters.”232 
Second, it relied on background rules directing that the CWA should be 
read narrowly in order to avoid bumping up incongruously against the 
constitutional structure.233 Third, it pointed to evidence suggesting that 
the regulatory landscape was unduly burdensome and unworkable.234 For 
Justice Scalia and the other members of the plurality, the policy 
underlying the individual statute took a backseat to concerns about how 
the interpretation chosen by the Court would square with the meaning 
given to other statutes containing the term “navigable waters,” the 
constitutional backdrop, and the permitting and regulatory system. 
Justice Kennedy provided the fifth vote in the case but refused to 
join Justice Scalia’s heavily landscape-oriented opinion.235 Instead, he 
authored a concurring opinion that exhibited significant crossover 
reliance on statute-specific coherence-focused interpretive tools. Rather 
than look to external dictionary definitions to provide a universal 
meaning for “waters,” Justice Kennedy argued that the appropriate test 
for whether a wetland constitutes “navigable waters” was the one 
established in Solid Waste Agency of Northern Cook County v. Army 
Corps of Engineers, a prior Supreme Court case interpreting the same 
statutory language.236 In Solid Waste, the Court held that in order to fall 
within the Corps’ regulatory authority, ponds and mudflats must possess 
a “significant nexus” to waters that are navigable in fact or that could 
reasonably be made navigable.237 In Justice Kennedy’s view, this 
“significant nexus” test was the established rule and should be applied to 
wetlands as well.238 
Justice Kennedy also referenced the CWA’s statutory purpose, 
observing that “Congress enacted the law to ‘restore and maintain the 
chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the Nation’s waters,’” and 
that the rationale for including wetlands is that wetlands “can perform 
critical functions related to the integrity of other waters.”239 He 
contended that wetlands should be deemed to possess the requisite 
“nexus” and thus, to come within the statutory phrase “navigable 
waters” if they “significantly affect the chemical, physical, and biological 
 
 232.  See supra notes 216, 218, 219 and accompanying text.  
 233. See supra note 228 and accompanying text.  
 234. See supra note 230 and accompanying text.  
 235. Id. at 759 (Kennedy, J., concurring in judgment). 
 236. Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 759 (citing 531 U.S. 159, 167 (2001)). 
 237. 531 U.S. at 167. 
 238. Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 759, 767. 
 239. Id. at 779 (quoting 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (2006)). 
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integrity of other covered waters . . . understood as ‘navigable.’”240 
Because the lower courts failed to apply the “significant nexus” test to 
determine whether Mr. Rapanos’s wetlands fell within the CWA’s 
coverage, Justice Kennedy argued that the case should be remanded.241 
For Justice Kennedy, maintaining a consistent policy across time with 
respect to the test for “navigable waters” and ensuring that the term was 
applied in a manner consistent with the CWA’s purpose were more 
important considerations than ensuring that the term “navigable waters” 
be construed consistently across the United States Code or with minimal 
constitutional side effects. 
Justice Kennedy’s concurring opinion also criticized the plurality 
opinion for producing an absurd result.242 He argued that the 
“permanent” or “continuous flow” reading of “navigable waters” made 
“little practical sense,” because it meant that “[t]he merest trickle, if 
continuous, would count as a ‘water’ subject to federal regulation, while 
torrents thundering at irregular intervals through otherwise dry channels 
would not.”243 Justice Kennedy went on to give real-world examples of 
rivers that might not be counted as “navigable waters” under the 
plurality’s reasoning.244 This is a classic policy constancy practical 
consequences argument, faulting the plurality’s interpretation for 
producing a nonsensical statutory policy. 
Justice Kennedy’s concurring opinion shows that there was more 
than mere results-focused decisionmaking at work in Rapanos. He 
reached the same outcome as the plurality opinion—no Army Corps 
jurisdiction over the wetlands at issue245—but based on very different 
interpretive tools and a very different interpretive focus. Moreover, he 
did so in a manner quite consistent with the interpretive tool preferences 
reflected in Table 2. He references statutory purpose and Supreme Court 
precedent, interpreting the same statutory provision in a slightly different 
context. 
In dissent, Justice Stevens, joined by Justices Breyer, Souter, and 
Ginsburg, focused on the consistency of the CWA’s specific policy over 
time, invoking four statute-specific coherence-fostering interpretive 
tools. First, the dissent argued that the Supreme Court’s decision in a 
prior case, United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc,246 had decided 
the precise question at issue, dictating that the CWA “authorizes the 
Corps to require landowners to obtain permits from the Corps before 
 
 240. Id. at 780. 
 241. Id. at 786. 
 242. Id. at 769. 
 243. Id. 
 244. Id. at 769–70. 
 245. Id. at 734 (plurality opinion). 
 246. 474 U.S. 121 (1985).  
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discharging fill material into wetlands adjacent to navigable bodies of 
water and their tributaries.”247 That opinion, the dissent insisted, nowhere 
limited the covered wetlands to those containing a continuous 
connection to permanent bodies of water.248 Second, the dissent 
referenced the CWA’s legislative history to argue that the Army Corps’ 
expansive interpretation of “navigable waters” had been ratified by 
Congress decades ago.249 The legislative history showed that Congress, in 
1977, considered and rejected an amendment that would have narrowed 
the scope of the Army Corps’ asserted jurisdiction;250 in the dissent’s 
view, this was powerful evidence that Congress deliberately acquiesced 
in the Army Corps’ interpretation of “navigable waters” to include 
wetlands.251 Third, the dissent criticized the plurality for casting aside the 
Army Corps’ longstanding regulatory policy, noting that the rejected 
interpretation reflected “30 years of practice by the Army Corps.”252 
Fourth, the dissent listed some of the practical ways in which wetlands 
can improve water quality and argued that the plurality opinion would 
result in arbitrary practical distinctions.253 For example, Justice Stevens 
noted, 
Under the plurality’s view, then, the Corps can regulate polluters who 
dump dredge into a stream that flows year round but may not be able 
to regulate polluters who dump into a neighboring stream that flows 
for only 290 days of the year—even if the dredge in this second stream 
would have the same effect on downstream waters as the dredge in the 
year-round one.254  
This last argument expresses a policy constancy-type practical 
consequences concern that the plurality’s interpretation will result in an 
incoherent statutory policy. 
Justice Stevens’s dissent also criticized the plurality opinion for 
ignoring the specific purpose and intent of the CWA and for misusing 
dictionary definitions.255 He quoted Supreme Court precedent stating 
that the CWA was “not merely another law” and that “Congress’ intent 
in enacting the [CWA] was clearly to establish an all-encompassing 
program of water pollution regulation . . . .”256 The plurality’s interpretation, 
 
 247. Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 792 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (alteration in original) (quoting Riverside 
Bayview, 474 U.S. at 123 (1985)). 
 248. Id. at 806. 
 249. Id. at 797. 
 250. Id. at 794. 
 251. Id. at 797. 
 252. Id. at 788. 
 253. Id. at 800.  
 254. Id. 
 255. Id. at 804–05. 
 256. Id. at 804 (quoting Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. 304, 317, 318 (1981)) (internal quotation 
marks omitted). 
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he lamented, undermined this fundamental statutory policy.257 Finally, 
Justice Stevens’s dissent, like Justice Kennedy’s concurring opinion, 
argued that the plurality’s reliance on dictionary definitions was spotty—
ignoring, for example, the dictionary’s treatment of “streams” as 
“waters,” and the fact that streams can be “intermittent” as well as 
“perennial.”258 Significantly, Justice Stevens employed these landscape-
oriented dictionary definitions only to rebut the plurality opinion’s 
dictionary use, not as an interpretive aid in their own right.259 
The various opinions in Rapanos provide a classic illustration of the 
Roberts Court’s interpretive divide, with the Justices in either camp 
facing off squarely over legal-landscape versus individual statute-specific 
coherence concerns. Only Justice Kennedy was caught in the middle, 
joining the landscape-coherence Justices in outcome but writing an 
opinion that relied heavily on purpose—an interpretive tool for which he 
exhibits a relatively high rate of reliance in Table 2—and other statute-
specific coherence-fostering interpretive resources. 
IV.  Theoretical Implications of the Coherence Divide 
The coherence divide identified in this Article raises several 
intriguing theoretical questions. Part IV.A compares landscape 
coherence and statute-specific coherence to theories of statutory 
interpretation espoused by some of the Justices in their opinions and 
extra-judicial writings. Part IV.B discusses the ideological implications of 
the coherence divide. 
A. Not Just Old Wine in New Bottles 
The interpretive divide described in this Article should not sound 
entirely foreign to those familiar with the Supreme Court’s interpretive 
methodologies. Indeed, some hint of the divide is plainly discernable in 
at least two of the Justices’ comments about the interpretive process. 
Justice Scalia has stated that when interpreting statutes, the members of 
the Court should “look for a sort of ‘objectified’ intent—the intent that a 
reasonable person would gather from the text of the law, placed 
alongside the remainder of the corpus juris.”260 Justice Stevens, 
conversely, has expressed the view that the Court should interpret 
statutes in a manner that avoids statutory incoherence: 
 
 257. Id.  
 258. Id. at 801. The dissent established this latter fact through references to topographical map 
symbols provided by the Department of the Interior. Id. 
 259. Id. at 801, 805 (rebutting the plurality’s dictionary use regarding the word “stream,” and citing 
the dictionary definition of “adjacent” to rebut the plurality’s definition of the word). 
 260. Scalia, supra note 1, at 17. 
Krishnakumar_62-HLJ-221.doc (Do Not Delete) 1/13/2011 10:43 AM 
December 2010]    ROBERTS COURT’S FIRST ERA 271 
There are occasions when an exclusive focus on text seems to convey 
an incoherent message, but other reliable evidence clarifies the statute 
and avoids the apparent incoherence. In such a case . . . we should 
never permit a narrow focus on text to obscure a commonsense 
appraisal of that additional evidence.261  
But despite some points of overlap, these two Justices’ comments about 
how statutes should be interpreted do not square on all fours with either 
the landscape-coherence or the statute-specific coherence approaches to 
statutory interpretation. Justice Scalia’s description focuses far more on 
what the reasonable person, or “objective” reader, would make of the 
statute’s text than on the meaning dictated by the common law, 
substantive canons, or other federal statutes. Indeed, he criticizes 
reliance on substantive canons,262 though such reliance is an important 
part of the landscape coherence approach. Moreover, he suggests that 
the corpus juris is secondary to the text in statutory construction; but in 
practice, many landscape-coherence Justices have proved willing to trim 
back a statute’s apparent textual meaning to avoid constitutional 
problems or to maintain consistency with the interpretation given to 
other similar statutes.263 In short, Justice Scalia’s description of the ideal 
interpretive practice fails to acknowledge—or to justify—how much 
judicial puzzle-working and harmonization between various pieces of the 
existing legal backdrop is involved in the landscape-coherence approach. 
Justice Stevens’s proffered approach similarly fails to map precisely 
onto the actual practice of the statute-specific coherence camp. First, 
Justice Stevens aims all of his fire at textualism, arguing that rigid 
adherence to the statute’s text is improper when it results in an 
incoherent message. In so defining the methodological battle, he 
completely ignores the role that landscape-coherence concerns—which 
emphasize avoiding incoherence in the legal system writ large—can play 
 
 261. Barnhart v. Sigmon Coal Co., 534 U.S. 438, 472 (2001) (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 262. See Scalia, supra note 1, at 28–29 (“To the honest textualist, all of these preferential rules and 
presumptions are a lot of trouble. . . . But . . . there is also the question of where the courts get the 
authority to impose them.”). 
 263. See, e.g., Nw. Austin Mun. Util. Dist. No. One v. Holder, 129 S. Ct. 2504, 2513 (2009) 
(explaining that construing the Voting Rights Act (VRA) to allow this utility district to bail out would 
raise serious constitutional concerns, and that the Court will not interpret a statute in a way that 
creates constitutional difficulties if there is some other ground upon which to dispose of the case); 
Bartlett v. Strickland, 129 S. Ct. 1231, 1237 (2009) (explaining that reading § 2 of the VRA to require 
crossover districts would raise serious equal protection concerns by forcing courts to make inquiries 
based on racial classifications and race-based predictions, and that to the extent there is doubt about 
whether § 2 of the VRA requires crossover districts, the Court must resolve that doubt by avoiding the 
interpretation that raises serious constitutional concerns); Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 153 
(2007) (“The canon of constitutional avoidance, finally, extinguishes any lingering doubt as to whether 
the Act covers the prototypical D&E procedure. ‘[T]he elementary rule is that every reasonable 
construction must be resorted to, in order to save a statute from unconstitutionality.’” (quoting 
Edward J DeBartolo Corp. v. Fla. Gulf Coast Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 485 U.S. 568, 575 
(1988))). 
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in taking the interpreter’s focus off of the individual statute and its 
specific message. Second, and relatedly, Justice Stevens justifies his 
preferred approach primarily through the argument that Congress should 
be presumed to act coherently when drafting and enacting statutes. 
Indeed, he considers it “disrespectful” to Congress not to make such an 
assumption.264 But this focus on coherent congressional behavior ignores 
the fact that the Justices in the statute-specific coherence camp often rely 
on factors unconnected to Congress’s actions when construing statutes—
for example, the Court’s own precedents interpreting the statute, the 
justness of a particular interpretation, or other practical consequences 
likely to result from the interpretation. Thus, while Justice Scalia’s and 
Justice Stevens’s remarks about the proper interpretive methodology 
touch on some of the important points of departure between the legal 
landscape and statute-specific coherence camps, they do not get to the 
bottom of what separates these two interpretive approaches: a focus on 
ensuring seamlessness with the rest of the legal landscape for landscape-
coherence Justices versus a focus on the specific statute at issue and the 
consistency and coherence of its individual policy for statute-specific 
coherence Justices. 
Hints of the statute-specific coherence approach also can be found 
in the longstanding interpretive methodologies referred to as 
purposivism and intentionalism. Purposivism instructs courts to choose 
the interpretation that best carries out a statute’s purpose;265 courts 
typically identify the statute’s purpose from its text, legislative history, 
prior judicial interpretations, or other background information, such as 
the “mischief”266 the statute was designed to correct.267 Intentionalism 
directs the interpreter to identify and follow the original intent of the 
statute’s drafters—to ask how the enacting Congress would have decided 
the question—and to construe the statute accordingly.268 Both 
 
 264. See Barnhart, 534 U.S. at 467, 469 (“If we assume that [the two sponsors] correctly understood 
their work product, the provision is coherent. . . . [T]he Court’s cavalier treatment of the explanations 
of the statute provided . . . by [the sponsors] is disrespectful, not only to those Senators, but to the 
entire Senate as well. For . . . it apparently assumes that the Senators were either dissembling or 
unable to understand the meaning of the bill that they were sponsoring.”). 
 265. See Henry M. Hart, Jr. & Albert M. Sacks, The Legal Process: Basic Problems in the 
Making and Application of Law 1374 (William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey eds., 1994). 
 266. See, e.g., Heydon’s Case, (1584) 76 Engl. Rep. 637 (describing the “Mischief Rule”). 
 267. See, e.g., Safeco Ins. Co. of Am. v. Burr, 551 U.S. 47, 62 (2007) (gleaning the Fair Credit 
Reporting Act’s “objective” from its statement of purpose); Burton v. Stewart, 549 U.S. 147, 154 
(2007) (identifying “streamlining federal habeas proceedings” as the AEDPA’s “goal” based on prior 
judicial interpretation of the AEDPA (citing Rhines v. Weber, 544 U.S. 269, 277 (2005))); S.D. 
Warren Co. v. Me. Bd. of Envtl. Prot., 547 U.S. 370, 380 (2006) (determining the purpose of § 401 of 
the CWA based on statements in the relevant senate committee report); see also Jerome Frank, Words 
and Music: Some Remarks on Statutory Interpretation, 47 Colum. L. Rev. 1259, 1269–70 (1947); Max 
Radin, A Short Way with Statutes, 56 Harv. L. Rev. 388, 398–99 (1942). 
 268. See, e.g., Eskridge et al., supra note 102, at 690; Posner, supra note 3, at 286–87; Pound, 
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interpretive theories proceed from the premise that Congress is the 
principal, or master, and that courts are its agents, or servants, charged 
with faithful execution of the enacting legislature’s underlying policy 
objectives (purposivism) or specific intent (intentionalism).269 Because 
both theories emphasize statutory purpose, legislative history, and 
legislative intent as interpretive guides, they may appear upon initial, 
superficial glance to equate with the approach taken by the statute-
specific coherence Justices. 
But there are important differences between the statute-specific 
coherence approach and the traditional purposive and intentionalist 
approaches. Purposivism and intentionalism place primary emphasis on 
the enacting Congress—either in terms of the policy objectives it 
established or in terms of its expectations regarding the application of 
the statute to the specific situation at issue.270 The statute-specific 
coherence approach, by contrast, places primary emphasis on selecting 
an interpretation that: (1) maintains internal statutory consistency, in the 
sense of ensuring that the statute’s various sections fit together sensibly, 
and that the meaning given to the provision at issue aligns with prior 
judicial interpretations of the statute; and (2) produces coherent policy 
consequences, in the sense that the interpretive rule established is fair, 
non-arbitrary, and not absurd.271 These differences translate to the 
 
supra note 3, at 381 (“[The interpreter’s role is] to find out directly what the law-maker meant by 
assuming his position, in the surroundings in which he acted, and endeavoring to gather from the 
mischiefs he had to meet and the remedy by which he sought to meet them, his intention with respect 
to the particular point in controversy.”). 
 269. See, e.g., William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Statutory Interpretation as Practical 
Reasoning, 42 Stan. L. Rev. 321, 325 (1990); John F. Manning, Textualism and the Equity of the 
Statute, 101 Colum. L. Rev. 1, 12–13 (2001). 
 270. See, e.g., Eskridge, Jr., supra note 32, at 1480; Eskridge Jr., supra note 4, at 626; Note, 
Looking to Statutory Intertext: Toward the Use of the Rabbinic Biblical Interpretive Stance in American 
Statutory Interpretation, 115 Harv. L. Rev. 1456, 1470–71 (2002). 
 271. An example may help make the differences between these approaches more concrete. In 
Dada v. Mukasey, the Court confronted an immigration statute that contained a provision granting 
every alien facing a court order for removal from the country the right to file one motion to reopen his 
or her removal proceedings. 128 S. Ct. 2307, 2310 (2008). A different provision of the same statute 
authorized aliens facing removal to request permission to depart the country voluntarily, in lieu of 
forcible removal, and if the voluntary departure request was granted, the statute required the alien to 
depart the country within sixty days. Id. The alien in the case requested and was granted voluntary 
departure. Id. at 2311. He also filed a motion to reopen his removal proceedings based on certain 
changed factual circumstances, including his marriage to an American citizen. Id. By the time his 
voluntary departure date arrived, the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) had not ruled on his 
motion to reopen. Id. The alien, accordingly, sought to withdraw his voluntary departure request and 
to remain in the country pending a decision on his motion to reopen. Id. at 2312. The statutory issue 
was whether an alien who has requested and received permission to depart voluntarily may withdraw 
his request and remain in the country in order to obtain a ruling on a motion to reopen his removal 
proceedings. Id. 
  A purposive interpretive approach would have dictated that the Court must identify the 
underlying objective of the immigration statute, or at least of the motion to reopen and/or voluntary 
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interpretive tool level: Purposivism focuses first and foremost on 
interpretive references to statutory purpose, while intentionalism focuses 
first and foremost on references to legislative intent.272 Neither traditional 
approach contemplates significant reliance on Supreme Court precedent 
or the practical consequences of a particular interpretation, since neither 
of those interpretive tools sheds light on the enacting Congress’s 
objectives or intent. The statute-specific coherence approach, by 
contrast, relies substantively on both Supreme Court precedent and 
practical consequences—and as the data in Table 2 shows, the Camp 
Two Justices exhibit high rates of reliance on both of these interpretive 
tools.273 
B. Ideology and the Coherence Divide 
Interestingly, the dividing line between the two interpretive camps 
tracks rather neatly the liberal-conservative ideological divide, with the 
Court’s conservative Justices tending towards landscape coherence and 
the Court’s liberal Justices tending towards statute-specific coherence.274 
The reasons for this correlation are unclear, but several potential 
explanations come to mind. One possibility, as noted earlier,275 is that 
Justice Scalia, who has been outspoken in his views about the illegitimacy 
of certain interpretative tools, namely, legislative history, purpose, and 
intent,276 has influenced the other conservative Justices to adopt his 
interpretive approach. But if so, his influence has been incomplete—he 
 
departure provisions, and that the Court must decide the statutory question in the manner that best 
complied with the objective the statute was designed to achieve; an intentionalist approach would have 
directed the Court to attempt to divine how the enacting Congress would have resolved the issue. Yet 
the majority, composed of statute-specific coherence Justices plus crossover Justice Kennedy, made no 
mention whatsoever of the enacting Congress’s intent and barely mentioned the statute’s purpose. See 
id. at 2318 (including two sentences, in passing, about statute’s purpose). Instead, it relied on the 
practical consequences that would arise from a decision not to permit the alien to withdraw his 
voluntary departure request. See id at 2317–18 (calling it “untenable” to force aliens to make a “Scylla 
and Charibdys” choice between the right to file a motion to reopen and the provision requiring 
voluntary departure within sixty days, noting the practical reality that it often takes longer than the 
voluntary departure period for a motion to reopen to be decided, and decrying the unjustness of 
allowing a particular BIA member’s backlog to determine whether an alien who has filed for both 
forms of relief gets to have his motion to reopen reviewed), and on inferences from the statute’s 
structure (the whole act rule) to conclude that the most sensible construction was one that permitted 
the alien to withdraw his voluntary departure motion. See id. at 2317 (noting that the way to make 
sense of and give meaning to both the motion to reopen and the voluntary departure provision was to 
allow the alien to withdraw a request for voluntary departure if necessary to obtain a ruling on his 
motion to reopen). 
 272. See Eskridge, Jr. & Frickey, supra note 269, at 325–26, 332–33; Bradford C. Mank, Legal 
Context: Reading Statutes in Light of Prevailing Legal Precedent, 34 Ariz. St. L.J. 815, 818–19 (2002); 
Peter L. Strauss, The Common Law and Statutes, 70 U. Colo. L. Rev. 225, 227 (1999). 
 273. See supra Table 2.  
 274. See supra Tables 2, 3. 
 275. See supra note 153 and accompanying text. 
 276. See Scalia, supra note 1, at 3–37. 
Krishnakumar_62-HLJ-221.doc (Do Not Delete) 1/13/2011 10:43 AM 
December 2010]    ROBERTS COURT’S FIRST ERA 275 
has not, for example, convinced Justices Kennedy or Alito to avoid 
referencing statutory purpose or legislative intent.277 Moreover, there are 
four Justices with crossover potential between the two statutory 
interpretation camps, but only one of these—Justice Kennedy—is 
considered a swing, or potential crossover, voter on ideology.278 Indeed, 
the statutory interpretation methodology preferences of Justices Alito, 
Souter, and Ginsburg seem difficult to explain based purely on 
ideology.279 
A second possibility is that the landscape versus statute-specific 
coherence divide reflects differences in conservative versus liberal views 
about the separation of powers and the proper role of the judiciary in 
reviewing legislative enactments. Our constitutional system is built on 
the premise that the best way to safeguard against tyranny is to separate 
the powers of government among three branches, so that each branch 
checks the other two.280 The Founders believed that although this system 
of checks and balances might at times paralyze the processes of 
government and thwart the public will, such paralysis was a worthwhile 
price to pay to prevent legislative despotism.281 Madison, Hamilton, and 
others even viewed the checks and balances as necessary brakes that 
would guard against impulsive legislation and ensure that only the best 
proposals would make it past the vetting process into law.282 
 
 277. See supra Tables 2, 3. 
 278. See, e.g., Adrian Vermeule, The Supreme Court, 2008 Term—Foreword: System Effects and 
the Constitution, 123 Harv. L. Rev. 4, 41 (2009) (“The Court routinely splits five to four in cases of 
political import, with Justice Kennedy as the swing voter.”). 
 279. As explained above, I attempted in this study to assess the correlation between ideology and 
canon use, but the small sample size of 166 cases and 352 opinions generated numbers for the 
correlation between ideology and each interpretive tool that were too small from which to reach 
reliable observations. See supra Table 2. During the 2005–2008 Terms, each Justice authored 
somewhere between 30 and 48 opinions and most interpretive tools were referenced at a rate of 
somewhere between 20 and 40%; thus, the number of opinions available to be assessed for correlation 
between a particular interpretive tool and ideology often was at or below fifteen. Id. 
 280. See The Federalist No. 51, at 347–49 (James Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke, ed., 1961). 
 281. See The Federalist No. 73, at 496 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke, ed., 1961). 
It may perhaps be said, that the power of preventing bad laws includes that of preventing 
good ones; and may be used to the one purpose as well as to the other. But this objection 
will have little weight . . . The injury which may possibly be done by defeating a few good 
laws will be amply compensated by the advantage of preventing a number of bad ones. 
Id. 
 282. See The Federalist No. 73, at 495 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke, ed., 1961). 
The [secondary] inducement to conferring the [veto] power . . . upon the executive . . . is to 
increase the chances . . . against the passing of bad laws, through haste, inadvertence, or 
design. The oftener a measure is brought under examination, the greater the diversity in the 
situations of those who are to examine it, the less must be the danger of those errors which 
flow from want of due deliberation, or of those missteps which proceed from the contagion 
of some common passion or interest. 
Id. 
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In the post-New Deal era, however, the lines between the different 
branches of government have blurred somewhat, as party allegiances 
have replaced institutional ones283 and administrative agencies with 
allegiances to both the executive and legislative branches284 have come to 
play a significant role in implementing statutes.285 Moreover, legislative 
and executive branch powers have expanded exponentially, as has the 
role of the federal government in regulating private and social spheres.286 
In the wake of these changes, it may be the case—as foreshadowed by 
FDR’s battle with the conservative members of the Supreme Court 
during the New Deal’s early years287—that conservative Justices, 
preferring limited government and limited federal regulation, have found 
it increasingly necessary to cabin the reach of ambitious legislation when 
interpreting statutes. That is, Justices with conservative political views 
may, as an ideological matter, be more wary than their liberal 
counterparts of congressional overreaching. Conservative Justices, 
therefore, consider it their role to check a statute’s meaning against 
established external sources such as the dictionary, the common law, 
prior judicial interpretations of related statutes, and other statutes 
enacted, in most cases, by earlier legislatures. Relatedly, they may be 
disinclined to interpret a statute’s text with reference to the 
 
 283. See generally Daryl J. Levinson & Richard H. Pildes, Separation of Parties, Not Powers, 
119 Harv. L. Rev. 2312 (2006). 
 284. See, e.g., Curtis W. Copeland, The Role of the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs in 
Federal Rulemaking, 33 Fordham Urb. L.J. 1257, 1305 & nn.270–71 (2006); Elena Kagan, Presidential 
Administration, 114 Harv. L. Rev. 2245, 2298 (2001); Robert R.M. Verchick, Toward Normative Rules 
for Agency Interpretation: Defining Jurisdiction Under the Clean Water Act, 55 Ala. L. Rev. 845, 850 
(2004). 
 285. See, e.g., Abner J. Mikva & Eric Lane, An Introduction to Statutory Interpretation and 
the Legislative Process 4, 46 (1997); Jerry L. Mashaw, Agency-Centered or Court-Centered 
Administrative Law? A Dialogue With Richard Pierce on Agency Statutory Interpretation, 59 Admin. L. 
Rev. 889, 903 (2007); see also Chevron v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843 (1984) 
(requiring courts to defer to reasonable agency interpretations of statutes). 
 286. See, e.g., Richard E. Levy, The Power to Legislate 57 (2006); Martin S. Flaherty, The Most 
Dangerous Branch, 105 Yale L.J. 1725, 1727, 1819–20 (1996); Betsy J. Grey, The New Federalism 
Jurisprudence and National Tort Reform, 59 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 475, 489 (2002); Gary Lawson, The 
Rise and Rise of the Administrative State, 107 Harv. L. Rev. 1231, 1236 (1994); Gillian E. Metzger, 
Ordinary Administrative Law as Constitutional Common Law, 110 Colum. L. Rev. 479, 508 n.104 
(2010). 
 287. During the early years of Franklin D. Roosevelt’s presidency, the Court struck down several 
of his most ambitious New Deal statutes on the grounds that they violated the Constitution’s 
separation of powers. See, e.g., United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 68 (1936) (“[O]ur Constitution 
prohibits the enforcement of the Agricultural Adjustment Act. The act . . . is a statutory plan to 
regulate and control agricultural production, a matter beyond the powers delegated to the federal 
government.”); A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 541–42 (1935) 
(invalidating the National Industrial Recovery Act as an impermissible delegation of legislative power 
to the executive branch); R.R. Ret. Bd. v. Alton R.R. Co., 295 U.S. 330, 368 (1935) (invalidating the 
Railroad Retirement Act as exceeding Congress’s power to regulate commerce). The rulings 
prompted FDR to retaliate with his infamous “court-packing” plan. See William E. Leuchtenburg, The 
Origins of Franklin D. Roosevelt’s “Court Packing” Plan, 1966 Sup. Ct. Rev. 347, 348. 
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untrustworthy, power-grabbing legislature’s intent, purpose, or 
extraneous musings in the legislative history. Liberal Justices, by 
contrast, may be more trusting of legislatures and more sympathetic, 
ideologically, to legislative and executive attempts to accomplish social 
policy change through legislation. As a consequence, Justices with a 
liberal political ideology may be desirous, rather than wary, of 
implementing the legislature’s underlying will when interpreting a statute 
and thus, inclined to seek out evidence of what the legislature intended 
for a statute to accomplish when determining the extent of that statute’s 
reach. 
Frank Easterbrook’s old position in Statutes’ Domains may also be 
relevant to the coherence divide. Easterbrook famously expressed a 
preference for cabining the reach of statutes and warned of the dangers 
produced when jurists interpret a statute to achieve more than the 
legislators who bargained and compromised over its provisions 
intended.288 “If the court always responds to the invocation of [a] statute 
by attempting to read the minds of its framers and supply ‘more in the 
same vein,’ and makes its share of errors,” Easterbrook argued, “every 
one of [those errors] will carry the statute to where costs exceed 
benefits.”289 In Easterbrook’s view, fulfillment of a statute’s policy to the 
utmost thus should not be the goal of the statutory interpreter.290 Rather, 
“the domain of the statute should be restricted to cases anticipated by its 
framers and expressly resolved in the legislative process.”291 Where no 
express legislative resolution has been made, Easterbrook advocated that 
the court should “hold the matter in question outside the statute’s 
domain. The statute [sh]ould become irrelevant, [and] parties (and court) 
remitted to whatever other sources of law might be applicable.”292 
There are noteworthy parallels between Easterbrook’s formulation 
and the landscape-coherence approach, which looks to sources of law 
external to the statute at issue to determine the statute’s meaning and 
eschews interpretive tools that seek to “read the minds” of the statute’s 
framers. Landscape-coherence Justices rely on common law precedent, 
other statutes, conventional word meanings supplied by dictionaries, and 
substantive canons based on constitutional or background legal norms, 
rather than on a statute’s goals or internal history to give meaning to the 
statute’s provisions. In this way, the landscape-coherence Justices are in a 
sense following Easterbrook’s directive that, absent clear legislative 
resolution of the precise question at issue, “the statute [sh]ould become 
irrelevant, [and] parties (and court) remitted to whatever other sources 
 
 288. Frank H. Easterbrook, Statutes’ Domains, 50 U. Chi. L. Rev. 533, 540–41 (1983). 
 289. Id. at 541. 
 290. Id. at 533–34. 
 291. Id. at 544. 
 292. Id. 
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of law might be applicable.”293 This makes sense because the conservative 
Justices’ resistance to statute-specific coherence seems grounded in 
concerns similar to those expressed by Easterbrook. For example, 
reliance on “more in the same vein” interpretive sources such as 
statutory purpose and legislative intent will lead to extreme statutory 
applications that lack balance and that pursue the policy of one law to 
the exclusion of all others.294 Moreover, the landscape-coherence Justices 
and Easterbrook seem to share an underlying view of the common law as 
superior to legislature-made statutes.295 
Third, and related to the above, it is worth noting that for most of 
the past seventy years, the Democratic Party has controlled Congress, 
presumably leading to disproportionate enactment of statutes with 
liberal purposes and intents and to legislative history reflecting the views 
of liberal senators and representatives. It is possible that Congress’s 
political composition during this period has played some role in the 
conservative Justices’ aversion to statutory purpose, intent, and 
legislative history as interpretive tools and, conversely, has led these 
Justices to place greater emphasis on external legal norms, including the 
precedents of an increasingly conservative Court. In other words, if 
Congress had been controlled by the Republican Party for the past 
several decades, then perhaps the Roberts Court’s conservative Justices 
would be less dismissive of statutory purpose, intent, and legislative 
history, and more skeptical of the external legal landscape—as a crutch 
holding back desirable change—in their interpretive methodologies. This 
third possible explanation, at least, is somewhat measurable by 
comparing the conservative Justices’ rates of reference to purpose, 
intent, and legislative history when the statute at issue was enacted by a 
Republican-controlled, versus a Democratic-controlled Congress. Future 
work organized around the statutes at issue and the political make up of 
the Congresses that enacted them should seek to measure more deeply 
such correlations between ideology and the Court’s statutory 
interpretation methodology.296 
 
 293. Id. 
 294. See id. at 543 (“The dominant purpose of some labor laws is to curb what is seen as the 
excessive power of employers over their workers; the dominant purpose of others is to curb what is 
seen as the excessive power of unions. What is a court to do when the union invokes one, the employer 
invokes another, and each asks the court to determine the case by construing the law—that is, by 
determining how the legislature that passed the law would have resolved this kind of case, had it been 
put?”). 
 295. See id. at 544 (“My suggestion is that unless the statute plainly hands courts the power to 
create and revise common law, the domain of the statute should be restricted to cases anticipated by 
its framers . . . .”). 
 296. One recent empirical study measuring factors that contributed to the Supreme Court’s use of 
legislative history from 1953 to 2006 has begun down this path, finding that the level of ideological 
alignment between the authoring Justice and the Congress that enacted a statute is a statistically 
Krishnakumar_62-HLJ-221.doc (Do Not Delete) 1/13/2011 10:43 AM 
December 2010]    ROBERTS COURT’S FIRST ERA 279 
Conclusion 
This Article’s empirical and doctrinal analysis of the Roberts 
Court’s 2005–2008 Terms’ statutory cases confirms what prior studies of 
the Supreme Court’s statutory interpretation methods have shown—that 
the Court’s actual approach to construing statutes defies the traditional 
lines scholars have drawn between textualism and intentionalism. 
Contrary to the conclusions reached by prior empirical studies, however, 
the data and doctrinal analysis in this Article also suggest that there is 
something more than pure eclecticism at work in the Justices’ reliance on 
particular interpretive tools. I have argued that that something more is a 
focus on ensuring coherence in the law, coupled with a philosophical 
dissonance over what form of coherence is most important: coherence in 
the external legal landscape or coherence in the internal, specific policy 
of the individual statute. The Justices’ interpretive divide over landscape 
versus statute-specific coherence, I submit, gives theoretical context to 
much of what the Court is saying between the lines in its statutory cases 
and clarifies how both the majority and dissent in the same case can take 
a judge-as-guardian-of-coherence approach to interpreting a statute, 
while reaching opposing constructions. In pointing out the Justices’ 
coherence divide, I do not mean to suggest that it is the only, or even the 
most important, factor at work in the Roberts Court’s statutory cases. 
Rather, my aim in this Article has been to illuminate an overlooked, but 
significant, philosophical point of departure underlying the Justices’ 
differing preferences for particular interpretive tools and, in so doing, 
perhaps to provide a theoretical alternative to the aging debate between 
textualism and intentionalism. 
 
significant predictor of the probability that a given statutory interpretation opinion will reference 
legislative history. See Law & Zaring, supra note 6. 
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Appendix of Tables 







Number of Opinions 
Referencing Practical 
Consequences 
Criminal statutes 45.3% 24/53 
Environmental 
statutes  25% 6/24 
Jurisdictional statutes  28% 14/50 
Federal Arbitration 
Act  36.4% 4/11 
Discrimination 
statutes  42.9% 21/49 
Civil RICO  22.2% 2/9 
Securities statutes 22.2% 2/9 
Preemption statutes 36.4% 8/22 
Immigration statutes  23.1% 3/13 
ERISA 30% 3/10 
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Number of Opinions 
Referencing Supreme 
Court Precedent 
Criminal statutes 26.4% 14/53 
Environmental 
statutes  25% 6/24 
Jurisdictional statutes  66% 33/50 
Federal Arbitration 
Act  63.6% 7/11 
Discrimination 
statutes  61.2% 30/49 
Civil RICO  66.7% 6/9 
Securities statutes 33.3% 3/9 
Preemption statutes 68.2% 15/22 
Immigration statutes  38.5% 5/13 
ERISA 40% 4/10 
Discrimination 
statutes  61.2% 30/49 
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the Whole Act Rule 
Number of Opinions 
Referencing the 
Whole Act Rule 
Criminal statutes 34% 18/53 
Environmental 
statutes  29.2% 7/24 
Jurisdictional statutes  24% 12/50 
Federal Arbitration 
Act  45.5% 5/11 
Discrimination 
statutes  24.5% 12/49 
Civil RICO  11.1% 1/9 
Securities statutes 11.1% 1/9 
Preemption statutes 27.3% 6/22 
Immigration statutes  38.5% 5/13 
ERISA 20% 2/10 
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Number of Opinions 
Referencing 
Text/Plain Meaning 
Criminal statutes 54.7% 29/53 
Environmental 
statutes  58.3% 14/24 
Jurisdictional statutes  36% 18/50 
Federal Arbitration 
Act  36.4% 4/11 
Discrimination 
statutes  38.8% 19/49 
Civil RICO  66.7% 6/9 
Securities statutes 33.3% 3/9 
Preemption statutes 45.5% 10/22 
Immigration statutes  46.2% 6/13 
ERISA 20% 2/10 
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Number of Opinions 
Referencing Other 
Statutes 
Criminal statutes 39.6% 21/53 
Environmental 
statutes  4.2% 1/24 
Jurisdictional statutes  22% 11/50 
Federal Arbitration 
Act  18.2% 2/11 
Discrimination 
statutes  20.4% 10/49 
Civil RICO  33.3% 3/9 
Securities statutes 22.2% 2/9 
Preemption statutes 22.7% 5/22 
Immigration statutes  30.8% 4/13 
ERISA 0% 0/10 
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Number of Opinions 
Referencing 
Dictionaries 
Criminal statutes 26.4% 14/53 
Environmental 
statutes  41.7% 10/24 
Jurisdictional statutes  12% 6/50 
Federal Arbitration 
Act  0% 0/11 
Discrimination 
statutes  10.2% 5/49 
Civil RICO  22.2% 2/9 
Securities statutes 11.1% 1/9 
Preemption statutes 9.1% 2/22 
Immigration statutes  23.1% 3/13 
ERISA 20% 2/10 
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Number of Opinions 
Referencing Common 
Law 
Criminal statutes 7.5% 4/53 
Environmental 
statutes  4.2% 1/24 
Jurisdictional statutes  6% 3/50 
Federal Arbitration 
Act  0% 0/11 
Discrimination 
statutes  6.1% 3/49 
Civil RICO  22.2% 2/9 
Securities statutes 22.2% 2/9 
Preemption statutes 9.1% 2/22 
Immigration statutes  23.1% 3/13 
ERISA 30% 3/10 
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Number of Opinions 
Referencing 
Substantive Canons 
Criminal statutes 17% 9/53 
Environmental 
statutes  8.3% 2/24 
Jurisdictional statutes  8% 4/50 
Federal Arbitration 
Act  9.1% 1/11 
Discrimination 
statutes  14.3% 7/49 
Civil RICO  11.1% 1/9 
Securities statutes 11.1% 1/9 
Preemption statutes 22.7% 5/22 
Immigration statutes  7.7% 1/13 
ERISA 0% 0/10 
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Number of Opinions 
Referencing 
Legislative History 
Criminal statutes 30.2% 16/53 
Environmental 
statutes  20.8% 5/24 
Jurisdictional statutes  20% 10/50 
Federal Arbitration 
Act  9.1% 1/11 
Discrimination 
statutes  30.6% 15/49 
Civil RICO  22.2% 2/9 
Securities statutes 33.3% 3/9 
Preemption statutes 18.2% 4/22 
Immigration statutes  7.7% 1/13 
ERISA 0% 0/10 
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Number of Opinions 
Referencing Intent 
Criminal statutes 24.5% 13/53 
Environmental 
statutes  20.8% 5/24 
Jurisdictional statutes  14% 7/50 
Federal Arbitration 
Act  9.1% 1/11 
Discrimination 
statutes  22.4% 11/49 
Civil RICO  11.1% 1/9 
Securities statutes 33.3% 3/9 
Preemption statutes 31.8% 7/22 
Immigration statutes  7.7% 1/13 
ERISA 10% 1/10 
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Number of Opinions 
Referencing Purpose 
Criminal statutes 17% 9/53 
Environmental 
statutes  37.5% 9/24 
Jurisdictional statutes  24% 12/50 
Federal Arbitration 
Act  18.2% 2/11 
Discrimination 
statutes  20.4% 10/49 
Civil RICO  22.2% 2/9 
Securities statutes 44.4% 4/9 
Preemption statutes 40.9% 9/22 
Immigration statutes  30.8% 4/13 
ERISA 10% 1/10 
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Codebook 
Note: For all of these canons/tools of interpretation, opinions should 
NOT be marked as utilizing the canon/tool if it mentions the canon as an 
argument raised by a party but then rejects/declines to rely on that canon 
in the case. For example, coders should not count the case as one which 
utilizes the Dictionary Rule if the Court mentions a definition given by a 
dictionary but rejects it as inaccurate or not reflecting common usage; 
nor should they count the case as one in which the Court engages in 
Agency Deference if the Court discusses the agency’s interpretation but 
rejects it and goes on to interpret the statute differently. 
 
AdditionalInfo = A variable recording additional legislative history 
information. Code “1” if the opinion is one in which Justice Scalia 
refused to join because of its legislative history use. Code “2” if the 
opinion is one that relies on the evolution of the statute, rather than on 
committee reports, floor debates, or other internal legislative records 
about the process of statutory enactment. Code “3” if the opinion is one 
that references both the evolution of the statute and internal legislative 
records. Code “4” if the opinion is one that references or draws 
inferences based on legislative inaction. Code “0” if the opinion does not 
fit one of the above special cases. 
 
Agencysimp = Code “1” if the opinion defers to the relevant agency’s 
interpretation of the statute. Code “0” if the opinion does not mention or 
if it rejects/goes against the agency’s interpretation of the statute. 
 
Author = Name of the Justice who authored the opinion being coded. 
Code “0” for per curiam opinions; “1” for opinions authored by Justice 
Scalia; “2” for opinions authored by Justice Thomas; “3” for opinions 
authored by Chief Justice Roberts; “4” for opinions authored by Justice 
Alito; “5” for opinions authored by Justice Kennedy; “6” for opinions 
authored by Justice Souter; “7” for opinions authored by Justice 
Ginsburg; “8” for opinions authored by Justice Breyer; and “9” for 
opinions authored by Justice Stevens.  
 
Case Name = Name of case. 
 
Case Term = Supreme Court Term during which the case was argued. 
 
Common Law Precedent = Code “1” if the opinion references common 
law precedent or analogizes to common practice in the same or another 
area of law (for example, “failure to exhaust is treated X way in the 
administrative law and criminal law contexts”). Code “0” if no reference 
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is made to common law precedents or practices, or if the opinion 
considers but rejects such precedents or practices. 
 
Dictionary Rule = Code “1” if the opinion cites and references one or 
more dictionary definitions; note the dictionary(ies) cited. Code “0” if 
the opinion does not reference a dictionary or if it considers and rejects a 
dictionary definition. 
 
Docket Number = The Supreme Court’s docket number for the case. 
 
Grammar Canons = Code “1” if the opinion references one or more 
grammar rules. Code “0” if the opinion does not reference grammatical 
rules or rejects their use. 
 
Ideology = Imported Spaeth database coding for ideological outcome of 
the opinion. “1” denotes a conservative opinion outcome, “2” denotes a 
liberal opinion outcome, “0” denotes an indeterminate ideological 
outcome. 
 
Intent = Code “1” if the opinion references Congress’s intent or 
presumed intent. Code “0” if the opinion does not reference legislative 
intent or rejects reliance on legislative intent. 
 
Landscape v. Statute-Specific = A group variable allowing for 
comparisons between the landscape- and statute-specific Justices taken 
together. Code “1” if the opinion was authored by Justices Scalia, 
Thomas, Roberts, Alito, or Kennedy. Code “2” if the opinion was 
authored by Justices Souter, Ginsburg, Breyer, or Stevens. Code “0” if 
the opinion was a per curiam one. 
 
Langgram = Code “1” if the opinion references either grammar canons 
or linguistic canons, or both. Code “0” if it does not. (If the opinion was 
coded “1” for either grammar or linguistic canon use, then it should be 
coded “1” for this variable as well). 
 
LanGRWA = Code “1” for opinions that reference any one or more of 
the following: language canons, grammar rules, and/or the whole act rule. 
Code “0” for opinions that do not reference any of these interpretive 
tools. 
 
Language Canon = Code “1” if the opinion references linguistic canons 
such as ejusdem generis, noscitur a sociis, expressio unius, or other word 
association canons. Code “0” if it does not or if it rejects linguistic canon 
arguments. 
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Leghistsimp = Code “1” if the opinion references legislative history 
documents or references the evolution of the statutory provision at issue. 
Code “0” if the opinion does not reference legislative history. 
 
Legislative History = Code “1” if the opinion uses legislative history to 
corroborate an interpretation dictated by other tools or canons or if the 
opinion actively references the legislative history to reach its result. 
Specify the kind and source(s) of legislative history cited. Code “0” if the 
opinion does not reference legislative history or rejects legislative history 
use. 
 
Legislative Purpose = Code “1” if the opinion references the statute’s 
purpose or goals. Code “0” if the opinion does not reference the statute’s 
purpose or goals or if it rejects arguments based on the statute’s purpose 
or goals. 
 
Margin = Code “0” for unanimous cases, “1” for 5-3 or 5-4 margin cases, 
“2” for wide margin cases with 6 or more justices voting in the majority, 
“3” for cases decided by a plurality of 4-1-4. 
 
Marginsh = Stands for marginshare, a simplification of the “margin” 
variable. Code “0” for unanimous cases, “1” for close margin cases 
decided 5-3/5-4 or 4-1-4 (i.e., cases where there are fewer than 6 justices 
joining the majority), “3” for wide margin cases with 6 or more justices 
joining the majority. 
 
Martype = A simplified variable that does not distinguish between close 
margin and wide margin cases. Code “0” for unanimous cases, “1” for 
divided vote cases. 
 
Opinion = Code “1” for majority opinions, “2” for concurrences, “3” for 
dissenting opinions, “4” for partially concurring/partially dissenting 
opinions, “5” for part majority/part concurring opinions, “6” for plurality 
opinions. 
 
Other Statutes = Code “1” if the opinion references other statutes (any 
reliance on other statutes, whether state or federal). Code “0” if the 
opinion does not reference other statutes or rejects analogies to other 
statutes. 
 
Practical Consequences = Code “1” if the opinion references the practical 
consequences that would follow from a particular interpretation or 
outcome in reaching its construction of the statute, including references 
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to the absurdity doctrine, the practical difficulty of administering the rule 
created by the interpretation, the justness or fairness of an interpretation, 
the interpretation’s predicted effect on judicial or other government 
institutions’ resources, the interpretation’s effect on the clarity or 
predictability of the legal rule in the relevant area of the law, and the 
interpretation’s consistency with the policy of the statute. Code “0” if the 
opinion does not reference the practical consequences that would flow 
from a particular interpretation, or if the opinion rejects arguments 
based on practical consequences. 
 
Practical Type = Code “1” for opinions that reference practical 
consequences that focus on the administrability of an interpretation—
that is, opinions that discuss the practical difficulty of administering the 
rule created by the interpretation, the interpretation’s predicted effect on 
judicial or other government institutions’ resources, or the 
interpretation’s effect on the clarity or predictability of the legal rule in 
the relevant area of the law. Code “2” for opinions that reference 
practical consequences that focus on the internal statutory consistency or 
the constancy of the policy created by the interpretation—that is, 
opinions that reference absurdities created by an interpretation, the 
justness or fairness of an interpretation, or the interpretation’s 
consistency with the underlying policy of the statute. Code “3” for 
opinions that reference both administrability and consistency-type 
practical consequence concerns. Code “0” for opinions that make no 
reference to the practical consequences of an interpretation. 
 
Scalia, Thomas, Roberts, Alito, Kennedy, Souter, Ginsburg, Breyer, 
Stevens = Each Justice’s name is a separate variable coded for agreement 
in the case. Code “0” for Author Majority; “1” for Joined 
Majority/Plurality; “2” for Joined Concurrence; “3” for Joined Dissent; 
“4” for Joined Majority and Concurrence; “5” for Not Participating; “6” 
for Authored Concurrence; “7” for Authored Dissent; “8” for Authored 
Dissent & Joined a Dissent; “9” for Authored Concurrence + Joined 
Majority; “10” for Joined 2 Dissents; “11” for Authored a 
Concurrence/Dissent; “12” for Authored a Concurrence + Joined a 
Concurrence; “13” for Authored Concurrence + Partially Joined a 
Dissent; “14” for Concurrence + Partially joined Majority; “15” for 
Authored Concurrence/Dissent + Partially Joined Majority; “16” for 
Joined a Part Concurrence/Part Dissent; “17” for Authored 
Concurrence/Dissent + Joined Dissent; “18” for  Partially Joined 
Majority + Joined a Concurrence/Dissent; “19” for  Partially Joined 
Majority + Joined a Concurrence/Dissent + Authored a Concurrence/ 
Dissent; “20” for Partially Joined Majority; “21” for voted to grant a writ. 
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Subject Area = Statute or field of law of statute being interpreted. Code 
“1” for criminal statutes; “2” for environmental statutes; “3” for 
jurisdictional statutes; “4” for the Internal Revenue Code; “5” for the 
Federal Arbitration Act; “6” for discrimination-related statutes; “7” for 
the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA); “8” for civil 
RICO; “9” for securities statutes; “10” for antitrust statutes; “11” for 
preemption statutes; “12” for the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA); “13” 
for the Bankruptcy Code; “14” for immigration statutes; “15” for 
ERISA; “16” for the Federal Communications Act; “17” for the Prison 
Litigation Reform Act; “18” for the Patent Act; “19” for the False 
Claims Act; “20” for the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty 
Act (AEDPA); “21” for the Federal Employers Liability Act (FELA); 
and “22” for other statutes. 
 
Substantive Canons = Code “1” if the opinion references a substantive 
canon – i.e., a background constitutional or policy norm or a rule about 
how a particular kind of statute is to be construed. Specify which 
substantive canon is being used. Code “0” if no substantive canon is 
referenced or if the opinion rejects a substantive canon as inapplicable. 
 
Supreme Court Precedent = Code “1” if the opinion references prior case 
law (Supreme Court opinions) interpreting the same statute or 
interpreting the same or similar words in a different statute. Code “0” if 
the opinion does not reference prior Supreme Court case law to interpret 
the statute. 
 
Text/Plain Meaning = Code “1” if the opinion references the 
clear/plain/ordinary/natural meaning, usage of a word, or the 
text/language of a statute in construing a word or phrase in the statute. 
Does not count mere quotation of statutory language at issue without 
more, and does not count comments that the text is ambiguous. Code “0” 
if no mention is made of statutory text or plain meaning, or if the opinion 
merely comments that the text is ambiguous. 
 
Whole Act Rule = Code “1” if the opinion references different parts of 
the statute at issue to determine the meaning of the provision/words at 
issue (common variants include the rule against derogation, meaning that 
different parts of a single statute must be consistent in their policy 
implications, and that one part of a statute should not be interpreted in a 
manner that derogates or undermines another part; the rule of 
meaningful variation, which dictates that if one part of the statute says X, 
and another similar part omits X, the difference is assumed to be 
intentional and to require a different interpretation; the rule against 
superfluity, which dictates that one part of a statute should not be 
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interpreted in a manner that renders another part of the same statute 
redundant or superfluous, and so on). Code “0” if the opinion does not 
reference the whole act rule or if it considers and rejects whole act rule 
arguments. 
 
